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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
There has been an increasingly well-documented, 
rapid rise in tobacco production over the last 
couple of decades in Mazowe, Zimbabwe, despite 
growing public health concerns about lung cancer 
and nicotine’s addictive capacities in the wealthier 
countries of the West – even affecting the South 
African market. This has been accompanied by a 
shift away from its production almost completely on 
large-scale farms towards predominantly small-scale 
farms, chiefly as a result of the Fast-Track Land Reform 
Programme (FTLRP) which oversaw a redistribution 
of roughly 10 million ha of farmland to 1.3 million 
smallholder farmers. To date, less consideration has 
been given to the implications of climate change for 
tobacco production. Given the hopes that it can make 
a serious contribution to poverty reduction and food 
security, it is of increasing importance to understand 
these implications, to identify the most relevant and/or 
effective adaptation options and to assess the viability 
of their successful adoption. Here, we present (to our 
knowledge) the first fine-grained, qualitative bottom-
up analysis of the implications for commercial tobacco 
production of climate change impacts in Zimbabwe. 
This report outlines the broad effects of climate change 
on cropping strategies in communal land, A1 and 
A2 farms in Mvurwi, and analyses the differentiated 
vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacities found 
across the farmers inhabiting these different types of 
land tenure.
The central message of this report is that when 
production is rainfed, tobacco is among the riskiest of 
the crops that are locally grown, both from a climate 
and a commercial perspective. These risks are 
accentuated by a rainy season which, since the 1980s, 
has become shorter, characterised by more erratic 
rainfall and more consecutive days with no rainfall. Our 
key findings are as follows:
1. Climate change and variability are already causing 
problems for tobacco production and have in the 
past 20 years already been, at times, catastrophic 
for Zimbabwean agriculture. 
2. Tobacco production appears to be implicated in 
higher levels of deforestation in Mvurwi.
3. Farmers are already adapting, but even with these 
adaptations tobacco and maize are riskier crops 
to grow than traditional grains. 
4. There are broad differentiations in vulnerability and 
resilience across and within communal area (CA), 
A1 and A2 farmers, resulting from uneven access 
to ‘the means of adaptation’. 
5. Tobacco farming can credibly be considered a 
land reform ‘success story’, but for whom? 
6. Contract farming and the Makoronyera (the black-
market) appear to be key ‘push factors’ in choices 
around tobacco production, especially at the 
margins. 
 A consideration of these findings prompts us to 
recommend the following adaptation options aimed 
at those most vulnerable to climate impacts, whilst 
identifying some of the underlying factors which will 
impinge upon their viability:
1. Investment in infrastructure which provide access 
for farmers who lack it
2. Explore possibilities for switching, in some cases, 
from tobacco to better-adapted crops
3. Stronger support for the commercialisation of 
better-adapted crops
4. Stronger support for existing agricultural extension 
services
5. Form cooperatives to strengthen collective 
bargaining capacity in tobacco price negotiation
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The implications of climate change for agricultural 
commercialisation – and the implications of agricultural 
commercialisation for climate change – are profound. 
On the one hand, agricultural production is by nature 
highly sensitive to climate change and variability. On 
the other, commercial agricultural production for 
international food markets is one of the lead sectors 
generating the levels of greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHGs) that are driving anthropogenic climate change 
(Vermeulen et al., 2012; IPCC, 2014). And yet, while 
perhaps most farmers across the Global South 
bear little or no responsibility for the sector’s carbon 
footprint, they are disproportionately exposed to 
climate change and variability right now. These are not 
just abstract or trivial effects: Zimbabwe is ranked in 
the top 20 countries in the world most affected by the 
impacts of extreme weather events from 2000–2019 
(Eckstein, Künzel and Schäfer, 2021). This research 
takes place against a background in which different 
parts of Zimbabwe have experienced three to six 
bad rainfall seasons between 2014–2019 (FEWS NET 
Southern Africa, 2021). Moreover, the Zimbabwe 
National Geospatial and Space Agency (ZINGSA, 
2020) finds that Zimbabwe’s climate has changed 
so dramatically since the 1980s – principally via a 
reduction in rainfall and an increase in average and 
maximum temperatures – that its agro-ecological zone 
classification system has needed to be redrawn. One 
of the changes is the identification of a new zone that 
is so dry, it is unsuitable for the cultivation of even the 
best-adapted crops (see Section 3 for more detail). 
The complicity, globally, of large-scale commercialised 
agricultural production in this deeply unjust outcome 
is a bitter irony, one which raises fundamental 
questions about the fairness and sustainability of the 
intensive agricultural model (see i.e. Newsham et al., 
2018a; Struik & Kuyper, 2017). More immediately, 
the risks posed by climate change and variability are 
becoming acutely evident for Zimbabwe’s small- and 
medium-scale tobacco producers in areas of the 
country such as the Mazowe District, where tobacco 
is grown commercially. Tobacco has long been part 
of the history of Mazowe, and readily finds its way 
into international markets (Scoones et al., 2020). Its 
production has historically been the preserve of large-
scale landowners. However, this changed from the 
early 2000s onwards, with the implementation of the 
FTLRP. This phase of land reform redistributed approx. 
10 million ha of farmland to 1.3 million smallholder 
family farmers in plots known as A1 farms (with farm 
sizes of 5–20ha), and 32,371 medium-scale farms of 
50–200ha (Hanlon, Manjengwa and Smart, 2013, p. 
20; Ngarava, 2020), inducing two large changes in 
tobacco production. First, whilst prior to the FTLRP, 
98 per cent of tobacco was grown on large farms, by 
2012, 53 per cent was grown by small scale farmers 
and 26 per cent by medium-scale farmers (Sakata, 
2018). Second, while in 1980 there were not much 
more than 1500 tobacco producers, by 2018 that 
number had soared to 124,000 registered tobacco 
producers (TIMB, 2018; Garwe, 2019). Meanwhile, 
although the quantity of tobacco grown plummeted at 
the start of the 2000s, when large farms were seized 
and redistributed it has now increased almost to its 
former levels (TIMB, 2016).
Both at the time the FTLRP happened and, in 
the decades since, it has been denounced as a 
catastrophe for Zimbabwe (Matondi, 2012). Other 
commentators contend that this framing of ‘failure’ fails 
to engage with the tobacco ‘success’ story currently 
underway (Hanlon, Manjengwa and Smart, 2013; Dube 
and Mugwaga, 2017; Scoones et al., 2018). Ngarava 
goes as far as to recommend “the specialisation 
and training of new [tobacco] farmers to improve 
productivity”, to increase yields (2020, p. 1). Such 
recommendations fit squarely within the predominant 
agricultural development paradigm, which sees cash 
crops like tobacco as a key mechanism through which 
agriculture can reduce hunger, poverty and inequality 
(Christiaensen, Demery and Kuhl, 2010; Lowder, Skoet 
and Raney, 2016). 
To date, however, there has been less research on the 
implications of climate change for tobacco production 
in Zimbabwe. Nhemachena and Mano (2007), Mugabe 
et al. (2013) and more recently the World Bank (2021) 
have produced downscaled climate projections for 
Zimbabwe which suggest more adverse conditions for 
the production of tobacco, among other crops, further 
into the 21st century. Yet these ‘top-down’ analyses 
feature methodological and practical limitations which, 
as we explore in Section 2, limit their utility to farming 
1 INTRODUCTION
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decision-making processes in the short-medium term. 
This research starts to fill these tobacco-specific and 
methodological gaps. It presents (to our knowledge) 
the first fine-grained, qualitative bottom-up analysis of 
the implications for commercial tobacco production 
of climate change impacts in Zimbabwe. Our data 
collection, based upon research conducted in three 
field sites in Mvurwi and Mazowe, is itself small-scale, 
but rooted in and supplemented by larger quantitative 
and qualitative studies in the area that have been 
conducted under the auspices of the Agricultural 
Policy Research Africa (APRA) consortium (Chitapi and 
Shonhe 2020; Scoones et al., 2020).
This report outlines the broad effects of climate 
change on cropping strategies in communal land, A1 
and A2 farms in Mvurwi, but in its analytical sections 
concentrates chiefly on the implications for tobacco 
production, as the most commercially important crop 
across our field sites. The key finding in this report 
is that when rainfed rather than irrigated, tobacco is 
among the riskiest crops that can be grown, both 
from a climate and a commercial perspective. This risk 
is becoming greater owing to a rainy season which, 
since the 1980s, has become shorter, characterised 
by more erratic rainfall and more consecutive days with 
no rainfall. This is the case even on land which, like that 
found across our field sites, offers ideal agro-ecological 
conditions for tobacco production in Zimbabwe. Our 
analysis focuses on, first, the differentiated vulnerability, 
resilience and adaptation profiles of farmers in different 
circumstances that correspond with varying degrees 
of benefit derived from efforts to commercialise 
tobacco; and second, the determinants of access to 
the resources, labour, markets, networks and other 
prerequisites of commercially viable, climate-resilient 
tobacco production.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines 
the conceptual and methodological foundations of 
the research. At the core of our methodology is a 
participatory vulnerability analysis toolkit (Ulrichs et 
al., 2015), which is grounded in and adapted from 
the ‘pressure and release’ framework elaborated first 
by Piers Blaikie and colleagues (Wisner et al., 2004), 
and supplemented by thinking on access by other 
political ecologists (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Section 
3 introduces the field sites of Chiweshe, Hariana and 
Arowan, where we worked with communal, A1 and 
A2 farmers respectively, and sets them in the wider 
context of commercial tobacco production in Mazowe, 
along with a broader consideration of the agricultural 
implications of climate projections for Zimbabwe and 
Southern Africa. Section 4 is conceived in terms of 
two broad objectives. First, it provides vulnerability 
profiles for each of our field sites, and second, turns 
to an analysis of vulnerability, resilience and adaptive 
capacity across the sites more closely focused on 
tobacco, with a view to teasing out the implications for 
adaptation options. Section 5 concludes the paper with 
a distillation of key findings relevant to understanding 
the extent to which commercial tobacco production, 
when practised under rainfed conditions, provides a 
poor vehicle for resilient agriculture, poverty reduction 
and the empowerment of women and girls, the core 
concerns of APRA research. It then proceeds to 
discuss adaptation options and the determinants of 
their viability.
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2.1 Conceptual and methodological 
underpinnings
2.1.1 Top-down modes of vulnerability analysis
This research is a ‘bottom-up’ vulnerability analysis 
of commercial tobacco production, understood 
within the context of the broader range of crop and 
livestock farming activities in the Mazowe district of 
Mashonaland Central, Zimbabwe. Here, we elaborate 
and contextualise this term, and explain how it 
relates to, complements and diverges from the ‘top-
down’ approaches to projecting and understanding 
that tend to dominate climate change discourse and 
policy. Conway et al. (2019, p. 504) define bottom-
up approaches as ones which seek to characterise 
contemporary and recent historical vulnerability to 
climate impacts, and further to “locate climate change 
within a broader array of vulnerabilities and behaviours”. 
As such, bottom-up approaches are a counterpoint to 
“top-down” approaches, which entail “taking climate 
model projections as a starting point to assess physical 
and ecological impacts, and using multiple projections 
to assess ranges of uncertainty for future states” 
(ibid., p. 503). Top-down approaches are crucial for 
illustrating why a human response to climate impacts 
need to be international and cannot be confined to the 
national and sub-national level. However, they are ill-
suited to understanding vulnerability, resilience and 
adaptive capacity contemporaneously, or for informing 
the short to medium-term timeframes within which 
farming decisions typically have to be made (Dessai, 
O’Brien and Hulme, 2007; Wilby and Dessai, 2010; 
Newsham and Thomas, 2011).
To understand this point more fully, we need briefly to 
consider the levels of uncertainty inherent in regional 
and global climate modelling. There is, of course, 
uncertainty over future levels of GHGs from human 
activity. This is commonly overcome by using different 
scenarios envisaging varying levels of GHGs over 
the course of the 21st century, often referred to as 
representative concentration pathways (RCPs). But 
there is also uncertainty over which models most 
accurately capture future climate change (Rowell et al., 
2016). In no small measure owing to this uncertainty, 
ensembles of models are used which generate a range 
of projected rises in temperature and precipitation, 
and this is one key variable in the modelling of climate 
impacts. It is possible to represent and communicate 
this uncertainty at the global and regional levels by 
identifying a range of models and setting out the 
range of variance between their projections. Hence, 
for instance, based on four different RCPs, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
5th Assessment Report (IPCC, 2014, p. 8) projects 
(with medium confidence) that global mean surface 
temperature change for 2016–2035, relative to 1986–
2005, “will likely be in the range 0.3°C to 0.7°C”. But 
from the perspective of formulating adaptation policy in 
specific contexts, this leaves us with as many questions 
as answers. First, projected impacts are different 
at 0.3° C than they are at 0.7° C. Second, this is a 
global average temperature projection, and the level of 
warming will exceed or stay below this level depending 
on where in the world it is happening. More crucially 
still, the modelling that does allow us to make this 
projection with some confidence is not, unfortunately, 
sufficiently concrete about the distribution, timing, 
frequency or intensity of the climate impacts at the 
local level – all of which are key to adaptation decision-
making processes (Wilby and Dessai, 2010), be they in 
relation to agriculture or other activities. Unfortunately, 
the efforts to ‘downscale’ the model projections to sub-
national level have not resolved these difficulties (ibid.).
2.1.2 Bottom-up approaches and political ecology
These limitations of top-down approaches to adaptation 
decision-making provide entry points for a bottom-up 
approach, and at least in part explain why we have 
used a bottom-up approach in this research. Attempts 
to analyse contemporary and historical vulnerability to 
climate impacts can give us a sense of the extent to 
which agricultural practice has been able to withstand 
climate impacts, and where the limits to what can be 
withstood lie (Broersma, Downing and Thomas, 2004). 
Understanding where the limits lie, and gaining insight 
into previous adaptations to climate impacts and how 
they modified these limits (Newsham and Thomas, 
2011), permits an analysis of (the limits to) current levels 
of adaptive capacity and, therein, a basis for identifying 
what adaptation policy support might be used further 
to bolster existing capacity.
2 METHODS AND CONCEPTS
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This vein of thinking to a significant extent informed the 
proliferation, in the 2000s and 2010s, of vulnerability 
(and adaptive capacity) analysis toolkits (e.g. Daze, 
Ambrose and Ehrhart, 2009; Ibrahim and Ward, 
2012; IISD, 2012). The toolkit we used to gather the 
data for this research emerged within this context. 
Methodologically, it is a modified iteration of a 
participatory vulnerability analysis toolkit (Ulrichs et al., 
2015). Our toolkit is very similar to others in a number 
of ways, and not least in its deployment of participatory 
methods as a way of understanding local-level 
vulnerability to climate impacts. What distinguishes it 
from these is that it is explicitly grounded, conceptually, 
in a long tradition of trying to understand vulnerability 
not principally in terms of the effects and characteristics 
of a particular environmental hazard. Instead, the focus 
is on the interaction of environmental hazards with the 
causes and distribution of exposure and vulnerability to 
harm across a society (for overviews of these different 
traditions see Adger (2006) or Eakin and Luers (2006)). 
This concern resonates more broadly with a diffuse area 
of work known as political ecology, which provides a rich 
array of conceptual and methodological underpinnings 
for understanding human-environmental relations, 
with particular attention paid to matters of politics and 
justice. Here is not the place to review the field (for that, 
see Forsyth, 2003; Bryant, 2015; or Robbins, 2020). 
But in the context of climate change adaptation and 
agricultural commercialisation, our engagement with 
political ecology is chiefly concerned with: 
a. How vulnerability and resilience in the face of 
climate impacts is shaped by the power relations 
governing resource access (Ribot and Peluso, 
2003; Wisner et al., 2004).   
b. The local manifestations of national and global 
political economy dynamics which enable and 
constrain courses of action – in this case, particular 
forms of agricultural commercialisation – across 
the different social groups found in our field sites 
(Escobar, 2010; Peet, Robbins and Watts, 2010).
2.1.3 Core characteristics of our modified 
Pressure and Release (PAR) Framework 
The underlying causal logic of PAR is the ‘progression 
of vulnerability’: root causes, dynamic pressures and 
unsafe conditions, in combination with the ‘trigger 
event’ of an environmental hazard, lead to potentially 
disastrous outcomes. Drawing on Wisner et al. (2004, 
especially p.p. 21–45) and Wisner, Gaillard and 
Kelman (2012), the progression of vulnerability can be 
understood as follows. At the heart of the framework is 
the ‘risk space’ in which disasters can and do occur, and 
which is intended to emphasise that the occurrence of 
disasters can only be understood through looking both 
at hazards and vulnerability together. The magnitude of 
Figure 2.1: Modified PAR Framework
Source: Adapted from Wisner et al. (2004)
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the disaster, it follows from this assumption, is a function 
of the characteristics of the hazard, in combination with 
the levels of vulnerability of the people exposed to the 
hazard, and is captured by the mnemonic DR = H x V. 
The rest of the framework is geared toward identifying 
the causal chains which give rise to disasters, with 
hazards on one side and vulnerability on the other. 
A large part of the exercise is understanding the 
vulnerability profile of lives and livelihoods in a specific 
location and documenting patterns of differentiation in 
levels and types of vulnerability. The more immediate 
explanations for such patterns of differentiation can 
be accounted for through an exploration of ‘dynamic 
pressures’ upon unsafe lives, livelihoods and locations. 
Dynamic pressures comprise often larger-scale 
external factors acting on and across specific places 
and groups of people. Dynamic pressures might range 
from ‘societal deficiencies’, such as level of state or 
other forms of support for disaster preparedness (and 
recovery), to societal exclusionary dynamics unfolding 
along lines of class, gender, age, ethnicity etc. They 
might also take the form of broader macro-level 
processes, such as structural adjustment, inflation, 
rapid increase in urban informal settlements, political 
upheaval, conflict, changes in the extent to which 
the logic of (local variants of) capitalism modify social 
relations, etc. Understanding dynamic pressures, in 
turn, requires us to trace the root causes of vulnerability, 
deriving from and being driven by longer-run historical 
processes. These may be distributive in character, i.e., 
the distribution of power, resources and wealth across 
a given society. They may be ideological, around the 
nationalist, militarist, capitalist, consumerist or other 
ideologies which characterise the political settlement 
within and across societies. In all cases, attention to a 
deeper, longer history is required.
In our model, this logic remains intact, but we have 
made three modifications and two innovations to 
the framework which better suit our purpose and 
focus. First, we narrow the range of hazards in the 
framework’s rightmost column to those related most 
directly to climate change. Second, with a view to 
operationalising the framework methodologically, in 
the guise of a participatory vulnerability analysis toolkit 
(Ulrichs et al., 2015), we adjusted the third column 
from the left. We inserted within it what we term the 
five ‘dimensions of vulnerability’ (DoV): livelihood 
strategies, wellbeing, individual capacity, collective 
capacity and governance. Each of the five DoV was 
assessed by the participatory tool we deemed most 
useful for understanding that particular dimension (see 
Newsham et al., 2018b for a more detailed breakdown 
of methods chosen for each dimension). The tools 
were implemented in a particular sequence, to build 
up and triangulate information collected in groups, 
and supplemented with semi-structured interviews. 
Third, the impacts of climate change can be not just be 
immediate but also cumulative, irregular and attritional, 
in ways that do not always give rise to a single, time-
bound ‘disaster event’. They might also take a form 
that is implicated in the reproduction of poverty, 
without ever manifesting as a disaster: for instance, 
a combination of lower and/or erratic rainfall which 
adversely affects crop yield and quality annually, rather 
than leading to the failure of a single harvest. For this 
reason, we swapped the ‘disaster risk’ at the centre of 
the framework for a focus on the broader ‘outcomes’.
The first innovation is to locate thinking around access 
within the PAR model itself, rather than as the adjunct 
‘access model’ which appears in chapter 3 of At Risk 
(Wisner et al., 2004). While access is an important 
component of their approach, it is unwieldy, in terms 
of data analysis and presentation, to have to use 
two frameworks. We suggest that one may suffice, 
particularly to the extent that access can itself be 
conceived as a dynamic pressure, and, therein, more 
easily incorporated into the PAR model. Rather than 
trying to shunt the access model in its entirety into 
the PAR diagram, we use the comparatively pared-
back approach of Ribot and Peluso (2003), with 
its focus on rights-based, structural and relational 
mechanisms of access. Our second innovation is 
an attempt to visualise better the relational, mutually 
constitutive character of the social, political, economic 
and ecological processes generative of vulnerability 
than we have seen in previous iterations of the PAR 
framework. This is the result of bringing the framework 
more explicitly into contact with thinking done within 
the ambit of the relational ontological turn. For reasons 
of space, we elaborate on the significance and utility of 
doing this only in Naess et al. (in prep).
2.2 Participatory vulnerability analysis 
toolkit
As mentioned above, the empirical research was 
guided by a participatory vulnerability analysis toolkit 
(Ulrichs et al., 2015). It was undertaken within three 
field sites: Chiweshe, on communal land; Hariana, a 
settlement characterised by A1 farms; and Arowan, 
the site of larger A2 farms (see Figure 2.1). All of these 
sites fall within the Mvurwi area of Mazowe district, 
in Mashonaland Central. The toolkit was designed 
primarily for collecting data on the five DoV at the heart 
of our conceptual framework. In brief, these dimensions 
can be characterised as follows:
1. Livelihoods and sensitivity– the livelihood 
activities are undertaken by people within the 
field sites, in particular those related to farming 
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and agricultural commercialisation, and levels of 
exposure and sensitivity of these livelihoods to 
climate impacts.
2. Wellbeing– the indicators of wellbeing as locally 
understood, with a view to understanding the 
distribution of access to the determinants of 
wellbeing (i.e. food, housing, capital etc).
3. Individual and household adaptive capacity– 
the extent and distribution of knowledge, skills, 
experience, assets and other means by which 
individual farmers and households adapted 
agricultural activity to climate variability and 
(anthropogenic) change.
4. Collective adaptive capacity– the extent and 
distribution of access to collective mechanisms 
of protection and adaptive capacities, such as 
mechanisms of labour and resource pooling 
across a location, the presence of state and private 
actors providing resources such as agricultural 
extension, credit, welfare or famine relief.
5. Governance and power relations– the quality 
of relations and level of presence, locally, of key 
state, civil society and private sector actors 
involved in the provision of goods and services 
associated with collective protection and adaptive 
capacity, as well as the power relations, formal 
and informal, which impinge upon the distribution 
of such provision.
To some extent, the toolkit was also able to capture 
elements of the dynamic pressures bearing upon the 
DoV, and to characterise the environmental hazards 
locally deemed most harmful to agricultural activities. 
It was not, however, designed to furnish data on the 
underlying root causes of vulnerability; and indeed this 
lack of attention to wider historical, social, political and 
ecological processes has been deemed a fundamental 
shortcoming of much participatory research (Cooke 
and Kothari, 2001; Hickey and Mohan, 2005). Our 
main sources of data for these wider processes came 
in part from other elements of APRA research, and in 
particular, the political economy work conducted in 
Zimbabwe (Shonhe, 2018; 2021; Shonhe, Scoones, and 
Murimbarimba, 2020), and in part from engagement 
with broader literature focused on climate change 
adaptation and agricultural commercialisation against 
a background of agrarian change in Zimbabwe.
2.3 Study sites and sampling
Our study comprised three field sites: Chiweshe, a 
communal area; Hariana, an A1 farm; and Arrowan, an 
A2 farm, all found in the Mazowe district of Mashonaland 
Central. A detailed description of each site is found in 
Section 4.1; here we cover only the rationale for site 
selection. See Table 1 for details on sampling and 
participants. Such is the centrality of post-2000 land 
reform in refashioning the political economy of access 
to productive resources in agrarian Zimbabwe, that 
any attempt to understand vulnerability to climate 
impacts would be incomplete without investigating 
the dynamics of differentiation (see i.e. Scoones et 
al., 2018) already evident across these three types of 
land tenure. Chiweshe, Hariana and Arrowan were 
specifically selected in large measure because: 
a. They had already featured in prior APRA 
studies, and therefore allowed triangulation and 
contextualisation of data. 
b. They could be identified, using existing APRA 
data, as sites in which substantial levels of tobacco 
production were occurring. 
c. They were well-known to the agricultural extension 
staff who facilitated field site access, had detailed 
knowledge of them and longstanding, good 
relations with their inhabitants. 
















Participation in focus group 





A2 farmers 319 2 5 20 80 54.2
A1 farmers 4529 8 17 59 41 4.9
Communal 
lands
2709 8 15 33 67 2.5
Source: Authors’ own
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The participatory methods were conducted with 
research participants over four to five days per site, 
entailing a mix of group exercises and semi-structured 
interviews. On day one participants engaged in a 
transect walk and village mapping wellbeing ranking 
exercise. On the second day, they produced historical 
timeline and climate trends and livelihood strategies 
and seasonal calendar. On day three, participants 
were involved in changing farming practices and crop 
ranking exercises. On the fourth day, participants 
completed a climate risk and coping mechanism 
matrix. Lastly, on day five, participants conducted 
institutional mapping and Venn diagrams. The group 
exercises and interviews took place mostly in Shona, 
the most widely spoken local language, facilitated and 
run by lead Zimbabwe researcher Shonhe, and co-
researcher Bvute, with initial training and facilitation 
input, as well as climate change adaptation expertise 
from Newsham. Access to field sites was expertly 
facilitated by Mr Athanas Chimombe of the Ministry 
of Agriculture’s Agricultural Research and Extension 
Services (AREX) arm, with assistance from Mr Edwis 
Bonga and Mrs Selina Simende.
Figure 2.2: Map of field sites within Mvurwi, Mazowe District
Note: The district is situated nearly 100km north-west of Harare and is classified as a high potential farming 
region, (natural region 2 – NR II) 
Source: (WT-shared) Shaund, Wikimedia Commons (2010), CC-BY-SA 4.0; Authors' own
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To inform the analysis of vulnerability to climate impacts 
in our field sites, this section sets out the consideration 
of historical, contemporary and future climate change 
and variability against a background of changes in key 
dynamic pressures, rooted particularly in changes to 
land ownership and access brought about since 1980 
and accelerated dramatically from the early 2000s, via 
the FTLRP. We briefly chart the consequences of these 
changes for the production of maize and tobacco, the 
two key crops grown in Mvurwi for subsistence and 
commercial purposes.
3.1. A brief history of land reform and 
tobacco production in Zimbabwe
European settlers established commercial farms and 
mines in the Mazowe District of colonial Zimbabwe 
between 1890 and 1930 (Kwashirai, 2006). The 
establishment of farms followed the change of focus 
from mining to agriculture, especially in 1908 when 
the British South African Company discovered that 
the second Eldorado that Rhodes had anticipated 
would not be found. A series of laws were introduced 
to facilitate the appropriation of land from Africans 
who had to be resettled in barren and drier lands in 
the reserves, now known as communal lands. The 
colonial agrarian economy during this time was 
largely dependent on state support which ensured 
that colonial settlers got agricultural funding while the 
production and accumulation potential for the black 
producers, who were eventually converted into labour 
in the white economy (farms, mines and nascent 
industry) (Arrighi, 1970; Phimister, 1974). Zimbabwe was 
divided into five agro-ecological zones (AEZs) which 
receive varying rainfall amounts and are endowed 
with dissimilar soil types (Vincent and Thomas, 1960; 
ZINGSA, 2020). Capturing and classifying the agro-
ecological characteristics of these zones, as well 
as their changing spatial distribution and extent (see 
Section 3.2.2 for more detail), has not solely been a 
neutral matter of scientific curiosity or an innocent 
aid to land use planning. It has also been entangled 
in the politics of land distribution and redistribution 
throughout Zimbabwe’s colonial and post-colonial 
history. Colonial dispossession relegated Africans to 
barren and drylands in the formerly tribal trust lands 
(TTL) – now communal areas – while the white farmers 
occupied the best lands in regions I, II and III. Where 
they occupied the drier areas, it was by choice and in 
line with the planned agricultural production. The land 
sizes for the drier regions IV and V were large to enable 
livestock production which was more predominant in 
these areas.
Initially, in 1907, the British South African Company 
which managed the colony launched a commercial 
farming programme for tobacco, maize, cotton, wheat, 
sorghum, groundnuts, and sunflower. By 1909, the 
Department of Agriculture was established as well as 
key technical institutions such as agricultural research 
stations which provided agriculture advisory service 
support to settler farmers (Kwashirai, 2006). The 
colonial government in 1912 established a Land Bank 
which was critical to settler success, which provided 
cheap loans for the purchase of farms, equipment, and 
other inputs (Kwashirai, 2006, p. 543). The production 
of tobacco and maize received major research and 
financial support because of their commercial and 
food value. In 1901, the first European settlers began 
growing tobacco in Mvurwi. By 1908, a third of settler 
farmers grew tobacco as a key cash crop (Rubert, 
1998, p. 2; Kwashirai, 2006). Mvurwi became a major 
centre for flue-cured Virginia tobacco production with 
the crop becoming a critical contributor to the national 
economy by the 1920s. The Mvurwi area concentrated 
on tobacco production, alongside maize, wheat, and 
soybean production. Beef production for export to 
the European markets was another key activity during 
this era. Massive investments in infrastructure (dams, 
roads, etc.), as well as subsidies for inputs, made this 
agricultural development possible. Prior to 2000, most 
of the commercial farms in this area carried out year-
round agriculture using irrigation with water sourced 
from dams (built on the farms) and perennial rivers and 
streams. By contrast, smallholder farming was viewed 
as backward and primitive and in need of improvement, 
rather than investment, even though most maize was 
produced by smallholder African farmers, especially in 
the Chiweshe area in Mvurwi.
A new agrarian political economy was occasioned 
by the FTLRP which was implemented in Zimbabwe 
from 2000 and reconfigured the agricultural 
3 CONTEXTUALISING TOBACCO FARMING, 
COMMERCIALISATION AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE IN ZIMBABWE
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commercialisation trajectory in the countryside 
(Shonhe, 2018). There are three broad changes that 
prompted a series of processes that affected ecology 
and the incorporation of agricultural commodities in the 
domestic global markets. First, the FTLRP transferred 
over 10 million ha of land from 4,500 white large-scale 
commercial farmers (LSCFs), to over 145,775 A1 family 
farmers, who own an average of 20ha of land, and 
22,896 small A2 medium and small-scale commercial 
farmers (SSCFs) holding an average of 142ha. There are 
400 agro-estates maintaining an average of 6,051ha 
which were not transferred by the FLTRP (Moyo, 2011). 
Albeit in a manner which raised its own questions of 
justice, this act of redistribution reversed a historical 
injustice associated with the subjugation of the Africans 
associated with the violent land dispossessions and 
subsequent settlement on less fertile lands in the labour 
‘reserves’. Second, and by virtue of the previously 
mentioned development, agricultural production 
shifted to align with the interests of the landowners 
who were less incorporated into the global value 
chains. Towards 2000, the LSCFs had shifted from 
food to cash crops (Scoones et al., 2010) while from 
the 1980s (Weiner, 1988), smallholder farmers from A1 
and communal areas led the food crop production, 
of mainly maize, sorghum and groundnuts. The new 
settlers initially continued with food crop production 
but soon shifted to cash crops, including soybeans, 
tobacco and sugar beans. For example, tobacco 
production rose from 6,310 to 136,000 smallholders 
between 2000 and 2018, while their annual contribution 
rose from 7,583 million kg to 179 million kg over the 
same period (TIMB, 2000; 2018). Additionally, millions 
of farmworkers were displaced when the large-scale 
white-owned farms were allocated for redistribution in 
the FTLRP (Rutherford, 2017), many of whom resettled 
in communal areas.
Third, the revision of the land tenure system occasioned 
by the FTLRP, in particular, the nationalisation of the 
land resulted in the replacement of the freehold tenure 
with 99-year leases for A2 farmers and ‘permits’ for 
the A1 farmers which extinguished the bankability of 
the land, resulting in inadequate access to loans for 
the new farmers. Besides, the Western countries 
had imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe, leading to 
capital flight (Moyo and Yeros, 2007; Shonhe, 2018) 
which eroded external credit lines and diminished the 
capacity of the banks to lend to the broad array of 
sectors, agriculture included. Also, as Shonhe (2021) 
observes, agricultural commodity markets were closed 
for horticultural crops.
Within this context, agricultural financing was 
reconfigured. Shonhe (2019) observed that from 2004, 
there was a rise in contract farming targeted mainly on 
tobacco farming, which is clearly evident across our 
three field sites. Contract farming is defined as “relations 
between growers and private or state enterprises 
that substitute for open-market exchanges by linking 
nominally independent family farmers of widely variant 
assets with a central processing, export, or purchasing 
unit that regulates in advance price, production 
practices, product quality, and credit” (Watts, 1994, 
pp. 26–27). The rise in contract farming thus led to 
the boom in tobacco production especially after 2009, 
when the marketing of the crop was liberalised and a 
monetary policy to pay farmers in foreign currency was 
introduced (Mukwereza, 2015). Even though maize and 
some other food crops such as sweet potatoes, sugar 
beans, sorghum and rapoko remain common, the shift 
to tobacco farming has been unprecedented.
Smallholder farmers are attracted to tobacco farming 
because it offers a foreign currency trading option, in 
a country whose macro-economic stability has been 
unstable for more than two decades, and inflation on 
locally denominated commodity prices has eroded 
business viability. This advantage is compounded by 
the lack of easily and widely available entry points 
into the commercialisation of other alternatives which 
could in theory be commercially viable, such as 
maize. Even though maize is supported under the 
government mediated command agriculture scheme 
– a contract farming scheme administered through 
the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), involving private 
and state funding managed through the Ministry of 
Land and Agriculture and a consortium of four banks, 
the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe, Standard Bank, 
Agribank and CABS building society – access for the 
majority of the farmers remains low and intermittent. 
Besides, the pricing regime has been uncertain even 
though at times it is above regional price levels. 
The GMB has also been accused of delaying the 
payment for the delivered crop which affects farmers’ 
preparations for the following season (Shonhe and 
Scoones, submitted). Be that as it may, the production 
is a crucial crop for farmers, both as a source of 
staple food, and therefore for food security, and is 
also used for payment of labour during the following 
agricultural season. While limited access to land and 
other resources may lead farmers to make a choice 
between the two crops, in most cases both crops are 
produced in varying proportions and depending on the 
availability of inputs.
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3.2 Climate change and variability, 
projected and historical 
3.2.1 Projected changes in climate and 
associated impacts in Southern Africa and 
Zimbabwe
As discussed in Section 2, the uncertainty inherent in 
climate projections, especially when ‘downscaled’ to 
the country level, rule them out as the basis for short 
to medium-term agricultural adaptation decision-
making processes. Nevertheless, they do give an 
important sense of the direction of travel. According 
to the projections for Zimbabwe available at the World 
Bank’s Climate Portal (2021), ‘downscaled’ from the 
IPCC CMIP5 (Coupled Model Intercomparison Project) 
general circulation models,1 annual temperatures will 
increase in the period 2040–59 varying between 1.2°C 
in RCP 2.6 (the lowest emissions scenario), and 2.2°C 
in RCP 8.5 (the highest emissions scenario) in 2040–
2059, and between 1.0°C (RCP 2.6) and 5.1°C (RCP 
8.5) by 2080–99 (see Figure 3.1).
Median annual precipitation is projected to decrease 
approximately between 1.2 per cent (RCP 2.6) and 
4.4 per cent (RCP 8.5) in 2040–59. By 2080–99 an 
increase of 2.8 per cent is projected under RCP 2.6 
but a decrease of 10.7 per cent is projected under RCP 
8.5, as captured in Figure 3.2. Significantly, rainfall is 
projected to decrease more during the rainy season 
1 For an explanation of the IPCC’s CMIP 5 general circulation models, see http://www.ipcc-data.org/sim/ 
 gcm_monthly/AR5/
(Oct–Mar), and while the northern regions may see 
above-normal precipitation, in the west and south, 
below-normal precipitation levels are anticipated.
It is important to note here is that even across the 
range of the ensemble of models used for temperature 
projections, they vary only in how much they project 
a temperature increase. They all agree that average 
temperatures will rise, not fall, and the question – and 
focus for adaptation – becomes one of magnitude. By 
contrast, there is no agreement across the ensemble as 
to whether precipitation will increase or decrease, and 
particularly at the most crucial time of year for farmers, 
the rainy season. For instance, the projections in Figure 
3.2 vary in December, from over 50mm more rainfall to 
almost 100mm less rainfall, depending on the model. 
Uncertainty in rainfall projections feeds, predictably, 
into uncertainty in the projection of climate impacts on 
agriculture in Zimbabwe. For instance, Mugabe et al. 
(2013) plausibly suggest that climate change may alter 
the parameters of Zimbabwe’s AEZs, with the driest, 
zone V, increasing in size, whilst zones II & IV, remain 
more favourable to agriculture. They also project an 
increase in maize yields across much of the country 
and losses of greater than 25 per cent in southern 
Zimbabwe. However, given that, as they themselves 
concede, the models do not even agree on a variable 
as crucial as what level of change there will be in 
rainfall, it is difficult to know whether these projections 
Figure 3.1: Projected change in monthly temperature for Zimbabwe 2080–2099, relative to 
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Source: World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal (2021)
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are capturing what will happen to maize production 
in Zimbabwe as a result of climate change. Moreover, 
as they acknowledge, even where the models agree, 
e.g., that average temperature across Zimbabwe is 
projected to rise across the 21st century, one model 
suggests that maize will be better suited to hotter 
conditions, whilst another suggests the opposite. Both 
cannot be right, and indeed both might even be wrong; 
but there is no way of eliminating the uncertainty, 
currently. Nevertheless, observed changes in climate 
over the twentieth- and into the twenty-first century 
– the subject of the following section – suggest that 
further change to Zimbabwe’s AEZs is highly likely.
3.2.2 Historical climate data and contextualising 
climate impacts 
As we have seen, the uncertainties inherent in 
future climate projections throw into sharp relief 
the importance of understanding historical and 
contemporary climate and weather dynamics. These 
reveal that farmers are already dealing with substantial 
changes in temperature and precipitation, and can feed 
into a wider assessment of existing levels, distributions 
and limits of adaptive capacity. 
Zimbabwe’s rainy season runs from October to March, 
which is also the hottest time of year, with temperatures 
peaking in October to November. The dry season, 
lower in temperature, runs from June to August. Mean 
monthly temperatures have ranged between 15°C and 
25°C from 1901–2016 (World Bank, 2021). Zimbabwe’s 
rainfall patterns are sensitive to two regional and global 
climate regime elements. First, rainfall affected by the 
El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), or El Niño cycle. 
During the rainy season, rainfall is on average lower 
during the warm phase of El Niño. Conversely, rainy 
season rainfall is often higher than average during the 
cool phase of ENSO (or La Niña). Second, the Inter-
Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) affects rainfall 
seasonality, with higher levels of rainfall received 
when ITCZ moves south, and vice versa (ibid.). Recent 
research by the Zimbabwe National Geospatial and 
Space Agency (ZINGSA) reports that changes in 
climatic conditions – and especially temperature and 
rainfall – have been occurring over the course of the 
20th century and more abruptly since the 1980s, with 
substantial implications for agricultural production. 
The ZINGSA (2020, pp. 10–11) report highlights how 
the rainfall season has decreased and shifted forward 
by at least 18 days, inclusive of Mashonaland Central, 
Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West, Matabeleland 
North, northerly areas of the Midlands and the rump 
of Manicaland. The report identifies a drying trend in 
the greater part of the country after 1982, and an early 
termination and thus reduction of the rainfall season by 
30 days in the greater part of the country, a decrease 
in the number of rainfall days and an increase in the 
number of dry spells of up to 20 days, which affect 
water availability and crop productivity.
According to the Climate Wizard tool, mean annual 
temperature is modelled, with medium confidence, 
to have increased by approximately 0.01–0.02°C/year 
from 1950–2002, with medium statistical confidence. 
Figure 3.2: Projected change in monthly precipitation for Zimbabwe 2080–2099, relative to 
1986–2005, via an ensemble of 16 models under RCP 8.5 (highest emissions)
Ensemble median and range
Month












Source: World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal (2021)
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According to the Zimbabwe Meteorological Service, 
daily minimum temperatures rose by roughly 2.6°C 
over the course of the twentieth century (cited in Brown 
et al., 2012). Daily maximum temperatures increased 
by 2°C over the same period and there were fewer 
cold days and more hot days (ibid.). These findings 
are broadly consistent both with the general global 
warming trend (IPCC, 2014) and with the ZINGSA 
(2020) analysis.
The significance of these changes to the climate 
regime appears to be fundamental. Zimbabwe has 
since the 1960s been categorised into five AEZs 
(Vincent and Thomas, 1960; Agritex 1984, cited in 
ZINGSA, 2020) which receive varying rainfall amounts, 
are endowed with a range of soil types and which vary 
significantly in the level of their utility from a farming 
perspective. The ZINGSA report (2020) has concluded 
that the spatial distribution and extent of these AEZs 
which, it contends, have been substantially altered by 
climate change. The report’s central findings are that 
“a smaller proportion of the country are experiencing 
better climatic patterns than previously observed and 
were thus assigned to AEZs that are more productive 
than in the original classification. However, a larger 
proportion of the AEZs shifted towards drier and less 
productive categories” (ibid., p. vii). On the basis of 
these changes, ZINGA has revised the agro-ecological 
zoning scheme, partly reclassifying different parts of 
the country within different zones, and partly by adding 
an ‘a’ and ‘b’ subdividing category to zone V. Zone 
Vb is a zone whose chief characteristic is that it is 
too dry for most non-irrigated agriculture to be viable. 
Not only does an average annual rainfall tend toward 
below 450mm, but the risk of maize harvest failure is 
projected at 60 per cent. Even with hardier traditional 
crops such as sorghum, millet and rapoko, the risk is 
put at between 20–55 per cent.
Our field sites, near Mvurwi, straddle the agro-ecological 
region IIa, which is considered a high potential farming 
region with an annual rainfall of between 750 and 
1,000mm. However, as Section 4 considers in greater 
detail, even in an area with good agricultural potential, 
difficulties resulting from the late arrival of rains and 
(even more) erratic patterns – which can lead to longer 
gaps between rainfall days or too much falling in one 
go – are raising questions about the viability of tobacco 
farming when irrigation is not available.
3.3 Shifting commodity production 
patterns in postcolonial Zimbabwe
3.3.1 Tobacco production 
The production of Virginia tobacco was mainly confined 
to the white commercial farmers while Africans were 
only allowed to produce Burley tobacco, as was the 
case in Chiweshe communal area (Shonhe, 2021). 
Before 2000, that is, before the land reform went 
through a fast-track phase, the production of tobacco 
remained dominated by LSCFs, with other farming 
models joining in only after 2004 when contract 
farming was hastened by the Chinese. As Figure 3.3 
shows, despite the introduction of contract farming, 
there was a serious decline in production which 
heightened from 2000 until 2006. The resurgence in 
Figure 3.3: Tobacco output (1994–2017) (tons) 
Source: Adapted from Moyo and Shonhe (2021)
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production from 2007, was not in sync with a general 
decline in the economy which reached its peak in 
2008 and a devastating drought experienced the 
same year. This resilience, as shown in Table 4.1, 
indicates that other factors, beyond climate change, 
may be responsible for some spikes and decline in 
tobacco production. This notwithstanding, political 
and economic instability during the period leading to 
2008 culminated in negotiations and the formation of 
a Government of National Unity (GNU), which ushered 
in a neoliberal economic regime whose major change 
to the agricultural policy was the introduction of United 
States Dollars as a currency tobacco trading, as well as 
the full remittance of the sold value of the commodity 
to farmers. Thus, a combination of the rise in access 
to contract farming, currency liberalisation and value 
retention enabled farmers to earn valuable returns and, 
in some cases, facilitated the production of tobacco 
through the reinvestment of their proceeds, from the 
previous marketing seasons.
While tobacco production is susceptible to climate 
change, the land reform and broader macroeconomic 
development thereafter, including monetary and 
market access provide incentives for production 
which is seen as crucial in policy decision making by 
farmers. In particular, access to contract financing, 
which for A2 and LSCF tend to cover the acquisition 
of capital equipment and meet labour costs, enable 
this category of farmers necessary to achieve high 
yield, allowing the farmers to maintain a consistent 
increase in production as was the case from 2009 
to 2017. To the contrary, A1 farmers and SSCFs 
experienced a drop in 2017, as the macroeconomic 
situation experienced another dive, associated with 
high inflation and shortages in foreign currency.
3.3.2 Changing commodity markets 
Within the context of uncertainty arising from a 
struggling economy, informalised commodity markets 
supplant formal ones as farmers from different 
scales of operations compete to maximise returns 
seasonally. Shonhe (2021) observes the emergence 
of Makoronyera – aggregate commodity traders who 
specialise in farmgate commodity purchases for 
onward trading in formal and informal markets for most 
agricultural commodities. In the case of maize and 
tobacco which are highly incorporated into domestic 
and global markets and operate under stop systems, 
through state marketing institutions, the emergence 
of Makoronyera creates new vulnerabilities and 
opportunities for farmers to secure better value for their 
agricultural produce. Shonhe (2021) illustrates how the 
input and output market is dominated by Makoronyera, 
including the export of tobacco through illicit channels. 
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic which came into the 
fray in March of 2020, smallholder farmers who are 
unable to participate in the marketing of crops at the 
auction floors tend to lose out as selling prices and 
quantities are manipulated (Shonhe, 2021). Similarly, 
Makoronyera are more active in the small-scale farming 
area. The small-scale farmers normally face difficulties 
in meeting operational costs, including the cost of 
transporting commodities to the market, compared 
to large-scale farmers, are thus more susceptible to 
Makoronyera trading where far lower prices are offered. 
Even though contract farming predominates tobacco 
farming, being between 94–99 per cent for communal 
and resettled farmers, Makoronyera take 52.1 per cent 
of crop and end up selling this through contract and 
independent floors or possibly exporting the crop 
through illicit means (Shonhe, 2021).
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4.1 Dimensions of communities and 
individual vulnerabilities, resilience 
and impact on agricultural production 
patterns
Communities and individuals suffer from varied 
dimensions of vulnerabilities, including differentiated 
shifts in livelihoods, wellbeing, “self” protection, 
collective protection and governance across scale, time 
and space, as illustrated in Table 4.1. For Zimbabwe, 
farmers’ vulnerabilities differ in terms of agro-ecological 
regions where the impact of climate change requires 
variegated farming/tenure systems, the role of politics in 
moderating resource access and the political economy 
of how different spaces were economically and socially 
shaped over time. This section analyses how these 
factors pan out in the three sites where the study was 
carried out. 
4.1.1 Chiweshe communal area
The formation of Chiweshe communal area followed 
patterns of the colonial history of Zimbabwe in which the 
indigenous population was moved from the alienated 
land in Mvurwi and other agriculturally rich areas 
apportioned to the white settlers from the late 1880s 
through the 1930s when the Land apportionment Act of 
1930 was promulgated. This dispossession of land was 
confirmed by ECG2 of the Muzariri clan, now resettled 
under the A1 scheme:
I was told this narrative by my grandmother. She 
said that this area used to belong to Chizaire. 
My grandmother could actually locate the grave 
of these people in the mountains. For example, 
in Marunzi and Mandindindi mountains, there 
are graves of the Muzariri people. I was born 
in 1949, they had already been moved and 
the place had been taken by the whites. My 
grandmother was born in 1906, she estimated 
they were removed from their places around 
1926/7. The land was being allocated to WW I 
soldiers. They would be moved from one farm 
to the other until they reached the TTL where 
they got settled. I may not know about chiefs. 
But, our chief in Makope was originally from 
2 All research participants’ names have been anonymised in our account, in order to ensure confidentiality.
Mutoko. The chiefs would fight for power and 
the one who won got to rule certain lands. That 
is how Chief Chiweshe got to be in charge of the 
Chiweshe area.
Unlike some TTLs (now communal areas), Chiweshe 
is situated in natural region II (NRII), which has 
historically received on average over 800mm of 
rainfall and is suitable for intensive crop and animal 
husbandry. In tracking the timeline of changes in the 
Chiweshe communal area, participants recalled that 
commercial agriculture commenced around 1946 
even though the use of fertilisers was popularised 
far later in 1958. The introduction of fertilisers was in 
some way forced on the farmers. As shall be detailed 
below, cattle sizes were reduced and hence the need 
to buy fertilisers in place of cattle manure. Barter 
trading was however being practised well before then. 
While relying on cow manure for soil fertility, crop 
production and livestock production were the main 
source of livelihood for the farmers.
In the post-independence period, virginia tobacco 
replaced burley tobacco which was the predominant 
cash crop for communal farmers. The colonial 
agricultural policy forbade communal farmers from 
producing the golden virginia tobacco (key informant 
interview with HKD, January 2020) ensuring that 
it was confined to settler white farmers. Maize has 
also been a key cash crop for farmers. The people of 
Chiweshe are still recovering from years of restrictions 
associated with the second Chimurenga war, as they 
were kept in ‘keeps’ from 1975 to 1979. Their homes 
and livelihoods were destroyed while their cattle were 
either taken away and used to feed the Rhodesian 
soldiers or were simply stolen while they were in the 
‘keeps’. Households in Chiweshe were also forced 
to reduce their cattle holdings under the Native Land 
Husbandry Act of 1951 (with households being limited 
to two herds of cattle). Household members however 
believe that this was ‘an act of mischief aimed at 
reducing their wealth’, compared to now when they 
face further threat from grazing land shortages (focus 
group discussion at Bare, Chweshe, January 2020). 
More recently, following the imposition of economic 
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sanctions from 2002, the markets for their cattle 
collapsed as evidenced by the disused cattle sales 
pens at Bare (see Figure 4.1), depriving the farmers 
of an important source of income, even though local 
sales through butcheries have continued.
Added to the previous land pressure occasioned 
by colonial dispossession, vernacular land sales 
in Chiweshe communal areas benefiting former 
commercial farm workers of foreign origin and some 
former urban dwellers, involved in urban to rural 
migration due to de-industrialisation, have increased 
pressure for land, resulting in some people settling in 
mountain tops, as was witnessed during transect walks 
in Bare. People have also settled from other areas such 
as Buhera and Guruve districts. The new settlements 
and the resultant pressure on the land is affecting cattle 
holdings as grazing lands have depleted and diseases 
have hiked. The pressure is also observable in the crop 
programming where riverbank farming and mountain 
farming has become more common, with obvious 
threats on the environment, including siltation and 
soil erosion and also subjecting the crops to threats 
from baboons, respectively. The struggle for land by 
landless Chiweshe villagers is real notwithstanding the 
FTLRP of 2000. Participants agreed during a focus 
group discussion that:
In the beginning the land was given to our 
forefathers by village heads when they came 
here. Back in the day they used to have big 
pieces of land. These pieces of land were later 
subdivided amongst their sons. The problem 
that we are having now is land shortages 
due to overpopulation. We have foreigners 
who came buying land illegally, as well as our 
own sons and daughters. As a parent you will 
have to subdivide your land to your children. 
This situation has been made worse by those 
returning from urban areas after losing their jobs 
and now want to farm. 
The people of Chiweshe communal area observe 
that they are getting poorer. Besides cattle diseases 
such as anthrax and the January disease affecting 
livestock production, the general economic challenges 
faced by the country after 1997 and poor economic 
policies, including those on agriculture, have impacted 
farmers’ accumulation trajectories. Farmers also 
highlighted the impact of sanctions, low commodity 
prices, inflationary pressure on farming inputs, foreign 
exchange policy induced distortions on commodity 
prices and the precariousness of the informal sector 
activities they have had to resort to. There is a sense 
of fear however that dissuades participants from 
openly discussing issues that they deem are of a 
political nature, such as these ones. To bypass these 
challenges, farmers engage in side-marketing of crops 
through Makoronyera, as will be detailed in sections to 
follow. Villagers also resort to piece work in the farms 
as has become more prevalent amongst communal 
villagers, as they struggle with social reproduction. In 
response to the shifting climate patterns, farmers in the 
Chiweshe area have adopted new farming practices 
for maize and tobacco for instance. New short-season 
varieties, winter ploughing, early planting and planting 
Figure 4.1: Disused cattle sales pens at Bare, Chiweshe
Source: Authors’ own 
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at different stages of the season, reducing planted 
areas and cheat seeding are the common adaptation 
approaches for maize by farmers in the communal 
Chiweshe area. Similarly, for the tobacco crop, farmers 
tend to resort to delayed planting, use of more fertilisers 
and the use of ridges to control water movement. 
However, access to fertilisers and improved varieties 
is not uniform, hence some farmers are able to cope 
while others regress.
4.1.2 Hariana A1 farm
The farmers at Hariana farm occupied through 
jambanja (violent and chaotic land occupations) 
from 2000 and were settled under the A1 scheme. 
The resettlement programme involved villagers from 
Chiweshe and many other rural areas in Mashonaland 
central province. Also involved were urban dwellers 
from Mvurwi town, Concession town and Harare 
(Sadomba, 2011). Initially, land occupiers were moving 
from one farm to another, dispossessing white 
farmers, often with the help or alternatively opposition 
from farmworkers (key informant interview, VC, Hariana 
farm, January 2020). Later on, war veterans, through 
the village committees of seven and in collaboration 
with the District Lands Committee, allocated land to 
occupiers and other settlers (Matondi, 2012). One A1 
settled farmer explained that land occupation was 
never a one-day event:
There was a sudden change with us blacks 
demanding our land. I came here on the 3rd 
of November 2000. We were being led by the 
war vets as we approached the white farmers 
and demanded him to leave. We stayed here 
until 2002 before we could get formally settled 
as the farmer was challenging the case in 
the courts, which he lost at the high court in 
2002. The AREX people then drew a map 
and they came up with 77 plots; three were 
allocated to the Mount Darwin people who 
were allocated because their district had no 
farms for resettlement. The majority of the 
settlers in this area were from the Mvurwi and 
Chiweshe area as they are the ones who did the 
jambanja. There was a percentage allocated 
to women, the Zimbabwe Republic Police, 
soldiers, prisons officers and war veterans. War 
vets received 15 plots. I was supposed to go 
to Donje farm but because I was an interpreter, 
the Ministry of Lands decided that I should not 
leave this farm. When they took over this farm, 
the Ministry of Lands declared that the other 
side belonged to the Dahwa family where the 
Mhondoro came from. We performed a ritual to 
our ancestors (kukanda fodya pasi) and brewed 
beer. The spirit mediums came from Dande and 
they spent three days there. Drums were being 
played. Chief Makope went to the centenary and 
he gave another beast which was slaughtered 
for the celebrations.
Access to land was therefore influenced by 
participation in jambanja, positioning in the security 
sector, gender and district allocations in the context 
of districts where there were no commercial farms 
for occupation. The resettlement programme also 
restored land through restoration, targeting those 
families previously dispossessed and were able to 
identify their original lands. For example, a Goredema 
(Figure 4.2) household member who together with 
other members of his family got resettled in Mvurwi 
indicated he was happy to be back to the home where 
they stayed before colonial dispossession:
My grandfather stayed here and invited the 
Gasa and Matemba families to join him and his 
family. There was a school called Goredema. 
Their boundary was defined by the fireguard. 
Their children often go to work for the farmers. 
In 1963, they were forced to leave and 
settle in Chiweshe in Katema area. Stanley 
Goredema was born here in 1963. He was 
accused of supporting the guerrillas during the 
Chimurenga war.
Resettlement in the Mvurwi area has changed 
the fortunes for the resettled farmers. Despite 
differentiated access to financing and markets, farmers 
in the A1 farming models are highly productive and are 
accumulating wealth. Mr CG, a war veteran who got 
settled at Hariana farm indicated during an interview 
that some crops do well for others but not for everyone:
Somebody had said it [tobacco] pays and 
I thought I should try it. I cultivated 1ha of 
tobacco in 2004. This was my first year doing 
it. In 2006, I cultivated another hectare and I 
realized that it was not paying and I stopped. 
Since then, I have been in command agriculture 
since the 2016/7 season. I now grow maize, 
soybeans and vegetables. In the 2019/20 
season I harvested 120t of maize which I sold 
through the GMB under command agriculture. 
I also get an average of US$12,500 weekly 
from market gardening. I have now managed 
to accumulate over 70 cattle, drill two bores 
and bought a residential stand in Mvurwi town. 
I plan to sell nine steers and start building a 
house there. I now struggle to expand my 
cropping programmes as I only have 6ha and 
have had to borrow 2ha annually from other 
farmers. I have also had to transfer 20 of my 
cattle to my son’s A1 farm as grazing land is 
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becoming a problem. I hope the government 
will consider allocating me a bigger farm. 
Some people have occupied grazing land 
illegally and this is causing challenges in 
accessing grazing pastures for our cattle. Here 
at Hariana we have almost an equal number 
of illegal settlers compared to those allocated 
land by the government. Former farm workers 
are mostly involved in illegal land occupation. 
This is, however, not the story for all the A1 farmers at 
Hariana farm. During a focus group discussion for the 
elderly farmers, Mrs YJ remarked that:
Around 1954, we used to farm but never sold 
our produce because we had no markets 
in Chiweshe. It is sad that there is a greater 
hunger now than in the past. The problem we 
have is that even if we sell; the money has no 
value. Land was never a problem for us. We 
used to do shifting cultivation. Now we have 
less than 1ha as the population has grown. 
We got allocated about seven acres each by 
our fathers. Since then, the lands have been 
subdivided, reducing the land to the current 
small sizes. The situation has also changed 
after we got allocated land but access to 
farming inputs made it difficult to produce. We 
are struggling to produce in excess to sell to 
the market.
Some A1 farmers, such Mr CG at Hariana farm are 
accessing special government mediated contract 
farming such as command agriculture and as such are 
able to perform well in maize and soybean production. 
However, others who are not participating in tobacco 
contract farming may struggle to produce. As Mrs HD 
remarked, the production of sweet potatoes which 
does not require as much financial outlay and has 
high returns has become more common for Hariana 
farmers. For those whose farms are mechanised, and 
own tractors or have access to irrigation for small pieces 
of land, they are able to engage in irrigated cropping 
programmes. A key variable by farmers is the pricing 
structure for the commodities, with farmers preferring 
cash and foreign currency generating crops such as 
sweet potatoes and tobacco respectively. However, 
tobacco is more common among the farmers given 
Figure 4.2: The Goredema family, Mvurwi A1 farm, restored
Source: Authors’ own 
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its ready market and foreign currency-based payment 
system. The few farmers who are growing sweet 
potatoes (Figure 4.3) however confirm that the crop 
faces less climatic variation risk and also has a ready 
market through farmgate sales and deliveries to Harare 
and Mvurwi towns. Mrs DZ narrated how she prefers 
growing tobacco as a source of foreign currency. 
However, as she acknowledges, the use foreign and 
local currency denominated payments for her sweet 
potatoes is also a source of attraction for the crop, 
much as ‘low harvesting and storage costs as buyers 
harvest the crop at their own cost (personal interview, 
24 February 2020).
However, crop production is also influenced by the 
shifting rainfall patterns. The impact of climate change 
is however mitigated through deep ploughing, winter 
ploughing and the use of improved short season varieties 
for maize. For tobacco, farmers use more seedbeds of 
different establishment dates, while planting soybeans 
during wet days is recommended. The use of chemicals 
to manage pests and diseases is also promoted by 
Agricultural Extension officers who advise farmers in the 
area (personal interview with GB, 23 February 2020).
4.1.3 Arrowan A2 farm
Arrowan farm was redistributed under the A2 farming 
model. There are 18 households settled from 2004. 
Unlike the A1 scheme where farmers were settled 
through jambanja, the A2 farmers were selected 
through a technocratic process and on merit (Zamchiya, 
2012). For example, RC who applied for land and got 
it at Arrowan farm in 2004 was selected because he 
was already farming commercially in Centenary. The 
A2 scheme was created to serve as capitalist farming 
enterprises in the place of the dispossessed white 
commercial farmers (Moyo, 2011). However, access 
to finance remains problematic in the context of three 
decades of an economic crisis, triggered by, among 
other factors, sanctions, economic mismanagement, 
political instability and frequent droughts. For instance, 
Mr RC, explained that he wanted to access command 
agriculture but failed. He used to grow tobacco but 
stopped due to a shortage of firewood. In the absence 
of bank finance and government support, he uses 
income from tractor hiring services to secure farming 
inputs for his cropping programme. He used to irrigate 
but his irrigation equipment was stolen and his yields 
Figure 4.3: A1 farmers planting sweet potatoes on an A1 farm
Source: Authors’ own 
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across the crops have decreased. Mr RC complained 
that the practice of paying 60 per cent for delivered 
tobacco was unfavourable to the farmers owing to 
reduced crop earnings, given that farming inputs are 
mostly sold in United States dollars.
The government generally favours A2 farmers 
in operational support provision. However, as 
was observed at Arrowan farm, joint venture (JV) 
arrangements are also common among A2 farmers. 
JVs are mostly entered between Chinese, former 
commercial farmers who are returning to the land, local 
private sector actors on one hand and the resettled 
farmers on the other hand. These arrangements 
bring in financial and productive assets investment 
which is retained by the resettled farmers at the 
expiry of the contract. While closing the financing 
gap which is obvious in the agricultural sector, the 
nature of the contract remains highly skewed in favour 
of global capitalism, with the government evidently 
unwilling to address the anomalies and often siding 
with global capital. To be sure, JVs are nothing close 
to what the name suggests as resettled farmers 
are mostly not involved in the management of the 
cropping programmes and typically can only receive 
+/-10 per cent of the gross income at the end of the 
season. In essence, this constitutes farm rental rather 
than a JV arrangement. It is a sophisticated way of 
dispossessing resettled farmers of their means of 
production thereby depriving them of the opportunity 
to earn surplus value, as the former white farmers and 
the new investors tend to benefit from over 90 per cent 
of gross revenue. Among other crops, sweet potatoes 
which are commonly among CA and A1 farmers’ 
favourite crops, have also emerged as a climate proof 
crop capable of reducing the cost of farming and 
transportation, and providing a source of revenue 
capable of reducing the negative financial impacts of 
climate change. In our study, farmers indicated that 
there has been a shift in rainfall patterns with the start 
of the season having shifted from around 25 October 
to late December in the study area. In addition, the 
rainfall amount received has also decreased annually 
(PKG, interview 23 February 2020).
Farmers indicated that there has been rampant 
destruction of property following their settlement at the 
farm. This resulted in the disappearance of irrigation 
infrastructure which could have benefitted the new 
farmers. The destruction of irrigation infrastructure 
meant that farmers were unable to cope with changing 
rainfall patterns leading to agricultural productivity 
declining. Farmers have adopted a variety of ways 
to reduce the impact of droughts, including seed 
cheating which involves placing the seed in water in 
a bucket overnight prior to planting the following day. 
Alternatively, shorter season varieties for crops such as 
maize and tobacco have been adopted to deal with the 
shortened season while drought resistant crops such 
as sorghum are opted for, even though the number 
of farmers involved remain low (personal observation, 
Arrowan farm, February 2021). However, as farmers 
observed during a focus group discussion, the new 
varieties are suitable for the shifting rainfall patterns but 
often lead to reduced yields and poor crop quality.
4.1.4 Cross-site sensitivity and vulnerability 
analysis
Farmers’ sensitivity and vulnerability differed along 
farming scales and models. The impact of climate 
change and socioeconomic political dynamics in 
Mvurwi is differentiated across farming scales and 
places (see also Annex 3). Newsham et al. (2018) argue 
that farmers’ vulnerability and resilience differ across 
farming systems, crops, age, gender, ethnicity and 
class, depending on the extent to which specific farmers 
are incorporated into the global commodity circuits. In 
addition, developing countries such as Zimbabwe are 
more vulnerable given the poor performance of the 
economy and thus its inability to create contingency 
and insurance funds to hedge against the drought 
associated risks often leads to acute shortages of food 
and a severe downturn in economic productivity (Belle, 
Sithabile and Ogundeji, 2017; Vogt et al., 2018). 
These are explained in detail here and in the sections 
to follow. Suffice to say, this lack of capacity to create 
contingent plans for vulnerable populations was observed 
in Chiweshe where due to drought, households needed 
welfare support from the state, in 2019. However, not 
all of them were able to access it. Such vulnerability 
was observed more prominently among illegally settled 
farmers in Chiweshe, where former farmworkers ended 
up establishing homes in the mountains due to land 
shortages and in the resettled area where illegal settlers 
are seen as a security threat by formally settled farmers. 
In both circumstances, illegal settlers are left out of 
welfare assistance by the government. These groups of 
farmers are also excluded from programmes such as the 
presidential input schemes, even though more recently 
they benefited from the Pfumvudza scheme – a climate 
adaptation programme launched by the Zimbabwean 
government in 2020. Thus, with the three sites, those 
without proper documentation of land ownership 
are less able to withstand climate change impact on 
agriculture, due to exclusion. Maguranyanga et al. 
(2021) also revealed how deforestation has risen due 
to tobacco production across all the sites. Even though 
tobacco is not the only threat, the differentiated ability 
of farmers to access coal, which is mainly accessed 
by those growing under contract farming, continues to 
threaten the environment.
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4.2 Climatic and biophysical hazards 
and impacts and implications for 
tobacco commercialisation 
The prevalence of droughts partly accounts for the 
decline in agricultural production after the FTLRP 
(Moyo and Nyoni, 2013). In our field study in Mvurwi, 
the timeline exercise revealed that droughts were 
experienced in 1967, 1972, 1982, 1988, 1992, 1995, 
2002, 2005, 2008, 2015 and 2019 (focus group 
discussion, Harianna, Mvurwi 2020, also see Frischen 
et al., 2020; ZINGSA, 2020). In other sites such as 
in Chiweshe communal area and Arrowan A2 farm, 
however, drought did not feature as a key historical 
event that may have shaped the community’s life 
trajectories or as harbinger of change, or being central 
to the history of the community settlement (focus 
group discussions in Chiweshe and at Arrowan farm, 
2020). Maguranyanga et al. (2021) analysed the rainfall 
patterns in wards 30, 29, 27, 26 and 8 in Mvurwi area 
for the period between 1980 and 2018, using indices 
for vegetation monitoring to assess environmental and 
climate change, commonly called NDVIs3. As Frischen 
et al. (2020, p. 1) argues, ‘droughts frequently occur 
with changing patterns across Zimbabwe’, but as 
Landmann et al. (2019) argues, the occurrence shows 
differentiated patterns of exposure with some being 
mild, moderate, severe and extreme.
As Figure 4.4 shows, the prevalence of drought is 
differentiated across the wards, both in terms of 
timing and scale. The 1988 drought highlighted during 
focus group discussions was seen to have been 
more pronounced in 8 in Chiweshe area, 26 and 30 
where Hariana is located, while there was no drought 
experienced at Arrowan farm. The 1992 drought also 
highlighted during focus group discussions was mild 
even though the overall decline in rainfall patterns was 
severe. Similarly, 2002 was very devastating across 
the wards, except for ward 30 (Hariana farm). Overall, 
however, from 1999, the Mvurwi area experienced 
3 Maguranyanga et al. (2021) explain the NDVI and advise that it is calculated as follows: “NDVI= (NIR+R)/  
 (NIR−R) whereby NIR and R is the surface reflectance in the near−infrared and red bands [AM1] [M2]  
 respectively (see also Rouse et al., 1974). The NDVI values range from -1 to +1. Dense vegetation is  
 represented by high NDVI. values, between 0.1 and 1. Conversely, non-vegetated surfaces such as   
 water bodies yield negative values of NDVI because of the electromagnetic absorption quality   
 of water. Bare soil areas represent NDVI values that are closest to 0 due to high reflectance in both the  
 visible and NIR portions of the electromagnetic spectrum (Lilles and Keifer, 1994)’.  Maguranyanga et  
 al. (2021) explain the NDVI and advise that it is calculated as follows: “NDVI= (NIR+R)/ (NIR−R) where 
 by NIR and R is the surface reflectance in the near−infrared and red bands [AM1] [M2] respectively (see  
 also Rouse et al., 1974). The NDVI values range from -1 to +1. Dense vegetation is represented by   
 high NDVI. values, between 0.1 and 1. Conversely, non-vegetated surfaces such as water bodies yield  
 negative values of NDVI because of the electromagnetic absorption quality of water. Bare soil areas   
 represent NDVI values that are closest to 0 due to high reflectance in both the visible and NIR portions  
 of the electromagnetic spectrum (Lilles and Keifer, 1994)’.
a decline in total rainfall received across the studied 
wards. In this sense farmers’ vulnerability varied 
across places, time and scale. While multidecadal 
analysis is difficult given the changing nature of 
drought occurrence, lack of spatial homogeneity and 
the absence of spatial and temporal consistent records 
over time (Mutowo and Chikonzi, 2014), the Mvurwi 
study reveals a pattern in which the rainfall received is 
generally declining across our three fieldsites. What this 
decline in rainfall points to is the increasingly essential 
role of irrigation in the production of commercially 
viable tobacco and other crops. However, inadequate 
government capability limits its capacity to develop 
and, in some cases, maintain existing irrigation 
infrastructure leading to rainfed cropping programmes 
(Muzari, Nyamushamba and Soropa, 2016; Landmann 
et al., 2019). This is particularly the case following 
the FTLRP and the imposition of sanctions which in 
turn also limited commodity markets, financial returns 
for farmers, undermining their productive asset 
accumulation ability. The production of crops such as 
maize, which is a staple food crop but highly sensitive 
to the impact of drought, faces great vulnerability and 
uncertainty with a huge impact on food security.
Notes: The lines reflect the different changes taking 
place in wards 30, 27, 29, 26 and 8. Farmers in 
Mvurwi revealed that the irrigation infrastructure that 
they inherited from the former white commercial 
farmers during jambanja (chaotic and violent land 
dispossessions) was either destroyed during land 
occupation or is now dilapidated owing to neglect and 
the resultant poor state of repair. As Shonhe (2019) 
highlights, some tractor cooperative schemes that 
were established with the intention to use existing 
irrigation infrastructure, left behind by the former white 
commercial farmers, have not been able to do so. A 
focus group discussion at Hariana farm revealed:
Even though we have a big dam here and there 
are underground irrigation pipes in place, we 
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have had no access to irrigation facilities as the 
pump is broken down and electricity supply has 
been disconnected. The government promised 
to restore electricity supply, but only after we have 
settled an outstanding bill which we accumulated 
collectively upon settlement in 2000. The tractor 
scheme that was intended to take advantage 
of the irrigation infrastrusture scheme is also 
struggling, having received the tractors about 
six years ago. In the absence of irrigation, some 
of the crops frequently face severe to moderate 
droughts which lowers the yields.
Besides the frequent occurrence of droughts, 
farmers in Mvurwi, also revealed through focus group 
discussions that they face many other threats during 
the farming seasons. These include erratic rainfall, 
cold fronts and pests, hailstorm and strong winds 
(key informant interview, DG, Arrowan farm 2020). 
Earlier, Harvey et al. (2014) observed that an attack by 
pests and diseases potentially leads to lower yield. In 
Chiweshe, frequent severe droughts pose the biggest 
threat, compared to erratic rainfall at Hariana farm 
and pests and diseases at Arrowan farm. The least of 
the highlighted threats is from hailstorms, cold fronts 
and erratic rainfall for the Chiweshe, Hariana and 
Arrowan farmers, respectively. Pests and diseases 
pose a threat across the sites, even though they come 
second and third at Hariana and in the Chiweshe 
area. Across study sites, however, the capacity to 
cope and adapt to the changing rainfall patterns as 
well as increasing threats of pests and diseases is thus 
differentiated. For instance, the threat of erratic rains 
and frequent severe drought is considered low among 
the A2 farmers due to the high prevalence of irrigation 
use across crops. This is not the case for A1 farmers, 
and much less for the Chiweshe communal farmers. 
Farmers in Chiweshe revealed that they have not been 
able to cope with the shifting and shortened rainfall 
season. While the establishment of an early tobacco 
crop is one way of reducing risk, the cost of doing 
so and poor access to the required machinery work 
against the farmers. For example, each plant requires 
a minimum of five litres of water during planting, yet, 
without irrigation or tractors to carry water bowsers, 
early planting becomes impossible.
Similarly, the crops face differentiated vulnerabilities. 
For example, in Chiweshe and at Arrowan farm 
tobacco faces the most significant threat, compared 
to tomatoes which are the most vulnerable crops at 
Hariana farm, as shown in Annex 1. Sweet potatoes are 
the least vulnerable crops for Chiweshe and Arrowan 
farmers, while they are the second most threatened for 
Hariana farmers. King onions are least vulnerable for 
this category of farmers. What this annex demonstrates 
is that, whether from the perspective of cultivating 
crops well-suited to respond to the decline in rainfall, 
or from a commercial perspective, for farmers that lack 
access to sufficient irrigation, tobacco does not make 
sense as a crop to focus commercialisation strategies 
on, relative to other choices of crop. To a significant 
extent, then, the key question is why tobacco – and 
also maize – are so central to commercial strategies, 
relative to other better adapted crops such as sweet 
potato, sugar beans or rapoko. To what extent would 
it make sense to switch to alternative crops, and what 
are the prospects for doing so, both from an adaptation 
and a commercial perspective? The answers to 
these questions, whilst central to understanding the 
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multiple implications of climate change for agricultural 
commercialisation across our Mvurwi fieldsites, are not 
straightforward. The biophysical risks faced by farmers 
have an impact on the production and accumulation 
patterns of farmers differentially across settlement 
schemes, but this is not the full story, as we explain in 
sections to follow.
4.3 Dynamic socio-economic and 
political pressures
Access to political networks and financial resources 
mitigate climate change, however this is moderated 
by the uneven access to these for small-scale farmers 
in the A1 and CA farming model and A2 farmers in 
the medium-scale and LSCF models, differentially. 
Within the farming models, not all farmers have the 
financial means to secure the productive assets and 
the farming inputs required. Not all farmers have the 
capacity to buy pesticides even though pests are 
the biggest threat to agricultural crop production in 
the A2 farmers’ category, for example. During an in-
depth interview, Mrs A Muzanenhamo, an Agricultural 
Extension Officer noted:
Maize is an important crop for farming 
households, as it is a source of food and a 
source of income. However, growing this crop is 
very risky as drought can cause the yield of the 
crop to decline. With irrigation, we rely on rainfed 
agricultural production which is very risky and 
results in losses. While some farmers in this 
area have been able to acquire pumps and are 
able to irrigate their crops, the majority of us at 
Hariana farm face difficulties. Besides, some 
farmers here have no cattle of their own and 
therefore they are unable to do winter ploughing 
to reduce the impact of severe drought. Access 
to fertilisers and pesticides is also influenced 
by political connections, such that those in the 
A2 farmers tend to have better access than A1 
and CA farmers as the latter are targeted for the 
command agriculture programme.
In this sense, those farmers endowed with productive 
assets such as cattle and tractors are able to reduce 
their sensitivity and vulnerability to climate change 
and socioeconomic and political downturns. Despite 
the high level of vulnerability, tobacco and maize are 
the most commonly grown crops in Mvurwi, while 
rapoko which has no risk threat is one of the least 
grown crops. The other crops with low vulnerability 
are king onions and sweet potatoes, with risk weight 
factors of one and two, respectively. Indeed, these 
biophysical factors that are affected by climate change 
impact on crop production, livelihoods and farmer 
accumulation. However, the choice of crops grown 
by farmers often defy these vulnerability assessments 
due to socioeconomic and political considerations. 
Upon reflecting on the vulnerability analysis in Annex 1, 
Hariana farmers realised that they have been growing 
the wrong crops and wondered if there were other 
factors beyond these that influences them to continue 
growing the maize and tobacco crops.
A separate process was used to assess these potential 
factors. Table 4.1 shows how agricultural production 
is influenced by socioeconomic and political 
considerations often in conflict with the efforts towards 
reducing crop vulnerability and farmers’ resilience. 
A focus group discussion held at Hariana farm, with 
A1 farmers revealed that farmers consider food 
sovereignty, access to labour and the related costs, 
availability of storage facilities, access to the market, 
road networks and transport availability, the role of 
politics and state policy, access to foreign currency, 
access to cash income and availability of agricultural 
financing. Farmers at Hariana farm considered 
access to agricultural finance as the most significant 
consideration for farmers, with a weight of 21.1 per 
cent, followed by access to labour and the ability to 
meet employment costs (14.1 per cent). At 4.2 per 
cent of the total score, food sovereignty is given the 
least consideration by farmers along with availability of 
produce storage facilities at 5.5 per cent.
Zimbabwe’s macroeconomic situation has been 
in sustained decline post-GNU characterised by 
shortages in cash and foreign currency. However, this 
study showed that in terms of priorities for farmers, 
access to cash and foreign currency are not the top 
priorities. At 12.7 per cent of the total score, access to 
cash ranks on par with the need to secure transport 
services and have accessible roads. Securing foreign 
currency is only considered after political pressure to 
produce certain crops or after some deliberation of 
available state support facilities such as the presidential 
input scheme or command agriculture, common 
for food crops, with score percentages of 11.3 per 
cent and 9.9 per cent of the total score, respectively. 
Similarly, and quite surprisingly, most farmers grow 
maize and tobacco crops for food and marketing 
purposes, yet the two crops attract the highest levels 
of economic vulnerabilities with a total score of 24 
and 16, respectively. To explain this anomaly, Mr G 
Fambirai, an A2 farmer in Mvurwi observed;
I grow tobacco and maize, mostly because I 
have access to contract farming and command 
agriculture financing. As such, the two crops 
have a ready market as Mashonaland Tobacco 
Company buy my tobacco and the GMB 
accepts my maize crop without any problems. 
Of course, we are unhappy that part of our 
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foreign currency earnings from the government 
is retained by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
which reduces our net income from the 
tobacco crop, but the advantage we have is 
that our input costs are met by the merchant 
companies anyway.
The GMB may delay our payments, as was the 
case some years back, however, the current 
pricing structure is competitive even though we 
are paid in the local currency. I also grow maize 
because I get to keep part of the produce which 
I use to pay labour during the following season. 
I combine these two crops with livestock 
breeding, mainly cattle as these complement 
each other. During difficult seasons, either due 
to experiencing severe drought or getting prices 
in the markets, cattle become a secure fall-back 
position through reinvestment in agricultural 
production through cattle sales.
Indeed, the A2 farmers have better access to financing 
and patronage networks, unlike the A1 and CA farmers. 
Among smallholders, limited access to financing in the 
context of an economy in crisis means that different 
sets of choices have to be made by small-holder 
farmers. For example, faced with these difficulties, 
crops with a low-risk score, such as sugar beans, 
sweet potatoes, rapoko, kingonions, groundnuts and 
soya beans are selected for production. Coincidentally 
these are the same crops that attract low vulnerability 
from biophysical threats identified above. However, 
during focus group discussions, one CA farmer in 
Chiweshe explained, regarding the production of 
Rapoko; 
There are mistakes that farmers in this area 
make. A perception that these traditional crops 
have no market or that the returns are low is 
both misleading and unhelpful. I grow rapoko 
annually and sell it at good prices. The market is 
there locally and in Harare. The GMB also buys 
rapoko at very reasonable prices. I also grow 
sweet potatoes and get handsome returns 
annually. Buyers come from as far as Bulawayo 
to buy sweet potatoes from my farm and hire 
their own labour to harvest the crop. They pay 
me in cash, either in US dollars or in the local 
currency. It all works for me because I meet my 
costs in either of the currencies. Again, with 
sweet potatoes, another advantage for me and 
my family is that we are assured of an alternative 
for bread for the next six or so months.
There is therefore arguably a level in which many 
farmers lack commodity market information, which 
results in a disconnect between supply and demand 
leading to pricing uncertainty and distortions for 




























0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Irish 
potatoes
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4
Sweet 
potatoes
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Maize 0 2 0 0 3 3 3 2 3 16
Groundnuts 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 5
Tobacco 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 1 24
Tomatoes 0 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 2 8
King onions 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 4
Soya beans 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 5
Rapoko 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 3




4.2 14.1 5.5 8.5 12.7 11.3 9.9 12.7 21.1
Source: Authors’ own, APRA climate study
Key: 0=No impact; 1=Small impact; 2=Medium impact; 3=Disastrous impact
30 Working Paper 064 | September 2021
some agricultural commodities, which in turn mis/
inform farmers’ making decisions. Where the demand 
for some commodities is unknown and prices 
are uncertain, commercial agricultural production 
becomes unsustainable, especially for medium to 
large scale producers in the A1 and A2 models. Poor 
farmers in the A1 and CA models become the main 
producers for such commodities, as they are less able 
to participate in the production of commodities that 
require greater financial outlay in the purchase of inputs, 
land preparation and labour hiring. Climate change 
and socioeconomic factors disproportionately affect 
smallholder farmers which impacts on crop choices 
and ‘make(s) their livelihoods even more precarious’, 
making food insecure (Harvey et al., p. 2014, p. 1). As 
Table 4.1 shows, maize and tobacco have high political 
and economic weight (the desire to secure foreign 
currency, cash sales and access to agricultural finance 
– command and contract financing) due to their role 
as staple foods and as sources of foreign currency. 
Yet, for the farmers, biophysical factors impact on crop 
viability, vulnerability and farmers’ resilience.
Moreover, the Zimbabwean economy is highly 
informalised such that the marketisation of agricultural 
commodities through the informal sector, often 
associated with illicit exports now predominates. 
In some cases, as in the case of soya beans, the 
government has introduced restrictions and regulated 
the marketing through the GMB, but this also has 
implications on the net value accruable to farmers, 
given that this route applies a local currency pricing 
structure which reduces farmers’ income. Across the 
farming scale, this increases farmers’ vulnerability. The 
Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board (TIMB) and the 
GMB are also assigned the role of administering stop 
orders for tobacco and maize respectively. However, 
Makoronyera now co-exist alongside the formal 
markets, offering both opportunities and challenges 
(Shonhe, 2021) that generate new crop vulnerabilities 
and often undermine farmers’ capital accumulation. 
Along the emerging variegated value chains, crop 
income changes often reduce farming viability and 
thus negatively reduce the capacity of farmers to cope 
with climate change adoption demands. In particular, 
Makoronyera offer far lower prices to farmers, leading to 
reduced ability to mitigate the impacts of climate change. 
Thus, the informalisation of the economy distorts the 
pricing matrix for most crops (key informant interview, 
DF, Arrowan, 2020). In the context of an economy in 
distress, Zimbabwe has unique crop choice decision-
making considerations. For example, across crops, 
in the post-FTLRP period, sanction-instigated capital 
flight (Moyo and Nyoni, 2013) and de-industrialisation 
has accompanied the collapse of traditional domestic 
and global commodity markets especially the closure 
of the European markets, securing new markets has 
remained problematic. Hence, smallholder farmers 
highlighted the importance of fair and accessible 
markets for tobacco, tomatoes and rapoko, compared 
to the existing commodity circuits or the absence 
of information on the same (Table 4.1. People are 
migrating from one class to another because they 
are engaging themselves in Makoronyera business 
which makes them rich, and some face disasters of 
erratic rains as well as dry spells which affect their 
yields and reduce their incomes. The proliferation of 
Makoronyera reflects collapsing governance systems 
where state regulations are not uniformly applied 
in the agricultural commodity markets. A tobacco 
contract leaf officer revealed that the increase in side-
marketing of the contracted tobacco crop is partly 
due to the failure by responsible authorities to enforce 
the stop-order system (interview with RJM, Mvurwi, 
2020). While tobacco merchants have intensified 
the monitoring of farmers, low penalty fees for those 
caught on the wrong side of the law result in some 
farmers participating in this illicit trade, either due to 
the attraction of the US dollars offered or the intention 
to avoid deduction in line with contractual obligations. 
Overall, the failure of the state to fully implement the law 
and growing corruption across the economy accounts 
for increased socioeconomic vulnerability for farmers 
(see Shonhe, 2021). 
In addition to collapsing governance infrastructure, 
aided by corruption, farmers also lack a collective 
voice to challenge the market conditions and combat 
the impact of Makoronyera. During focus group 
discussions, farmers revealed their reduced roles and 
participation in farmers networks and associations. 
Compared to the historical role of associations in 
white-led commercial agriculture from 1908, especially 
after 1923 when farmers voted for an independent 
government and became members of parliament and 
ministers in government, current farmers are highly 
fragmented (Selby, 2006; Shonhe, 2021) and lack the 
ability to exercise collective action. Without a collective 
voice, farmers’ livelihoods and cropping programmes 
are extremely vulnerable and their resilience eroded.
4.4 Community, individual 
vulnerabilities and social 
differentiation
How then do climate change and power distribution, 
differences in access across farming models and 
differentiated farming patterns impact vulnerability 
and social differentiation? Even though climate change 
and variability have dissimilar incidence across agro-
ecological regions and affect farmers in a similar 
fashion across scale, impacts on farmers are more 
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intense among smallholders who have limited access 
to productive assets such as irrigation infrastructure. 
Through focus group discussions the study revealed 
that farmers understood their wellbeing differently 
and therefore their understanding of their social status 
varied across farming models (see Table 4.2, and 
Annex 2 for more detail).
This is reflected in the attributes or requirements that 
farmers mostly associated with wellbeing and the 
distribution across people in their area of access to 
wellbeing. The naming and description of classes is 
informed by how participants captured this uneven 
distribution of wellbeing (see Annex 2 for more 
detail). Importantly, the factors deemed significant 
for assessing wellbeing also differed. In the CA, 






Selected descriptions and quotations from focus group discussions
Communal area
Rich AM Those who are rich have houses with asbestos or zinc roofing, in some cases they have 
solar or electricity as a source of energy, they also have toilets in their houses.
Middle B I belong to the middle class because I’m an employed civil servant. Also, people who are 
into commercial farming can be middle class too.
Lower TS I belong to the lower class; the reason being that I’m not married, I also do not have cattle, 
and I have no ploughs.
Poor JM Those who are poor who don't have education and who own small pieces of land.
Very poor AM The very poor people are people without cattle; they are labourers in other people’s lands. 
Those people who are in the very poor category are those with inadequate housing; they 
have a thatch house.
A1 farmers
Very rich TM I have a borehole, land for which I have the title deeds and cattle. I have access to 
implements including a tractor disc and diesel. I also have three workers and access to 
cash. I also have 50 chickens.
Rich LW I’m rich. I have a well and a borehole though I haven’t started to use it yet. I have cattle. I 
also have land and I work as an electrician. I’m an employer with three permanent staff at 
my house and I have several casual workers. I have a house in Harare, here and a stand 
in Mvurwi. I also have security. I am now applying for my title deeds for my house. In a few 
months I will be in the very rich class.
Middle FK I’m in the middle class. I used to have 15 cattle but due to unforeseen circumstances I’m 
left with 10. I have 8ha of land. I farm all of it. I have two cars. I have a stand in Mvurwi. I 
have my own plough. I don’t have permanent workers. I rely on hired labour.
Poor EC I’m a widow, I don’t have a car and I have no cattle. In terms of workers, I rely on hired 
labour, I have a plough stand with title deeds and I have access to loans, and I have land. 
I’m not into contract farming.
Very poor TS They rely on selling labour and have no land of their own. They do not grow enough for their 
own household consumption.
A2 farmers
Best RC The rich can employ 50 or more people. They own 300–400 cattle. They also have access 
to government loans. They use the latest technology when irrigating.
Better PC These people can access medical aid as well as private healthcare. However, they do not 
pay their workers consistently. They also have access to accumulation of assets as well 
as government loans. The majority in this class have so many contacts – for example, 
contracts with tobacco contacting companies as well as command agriculture.
Good NM I classify myself as good. I have minimum access to the outside markets. I have an irrigation 
system which is sufficient for me to farm. I have enough money, but I don’t go to the private 
doctors. I make use of the public healthcare system.
Average NM These people are struggling. They do not have much, they do piece [rate pay] jobs most 
of the cases. They also get their inputs from contract farming. However, the inputs from 
contract farming are not reliable. As we speak, we haven’t received the fertilisers for this 
season.
Vulnerable NM These are people who sell groundnuts on the roadside. They do not have workers and 
rely on family labour. These people die in their houses and sometimes get access to illegal 
drugs since they cannot afford to pay in the pharmacies. Sometimes they rely on prophets 
and traditional healers.
Source: Authors’ own
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households named food security, shelter, water and 
education as the key requirements for wellbeing. In 
the A1 farms, the main requirements were access to 
land, health, cattle, security of tenure, money, shelter, 
food, water and access to labour. In the A2 models, 
the main requirements were seen as access to land, 
health, cattle, money, marketing and access to labour. 
The wellbeing of the farmers is thus linked to access 
to land, productive assets and financing opportunities. 
Shonhe and Scoones (submitted) observes how, due to 
differences in access to financing farmers accumulate 
differently, across scale, as identified in our field sites. 
At least 35.9 per cent of the A2 farmers accessed 
tobacco contract financing, compared to 17.5 per 
cent among the A1 farmers and 13.1 per cent in the 
communal areas. Similarly, 47.5 per cent got support 
through the maize oriented Command Agriculture 
scheme, compared to 16.1 per cent for the A1 farmers 
and 2.9 per cent for communal farmers in Mvurwi in 
2019. Consequently, while 1.4 per cent of A2 farmers 
had water pumps, only 0.1 per cent and 0.3 per cent 
of A1 and communal farmers had them. On average 
A2 farmers had 25.6 herds of cattle compared to A1 
farmers who had nine and communal farmers who had 
six. Shonhe (2019) also revealed that 24.5 per cent, 4 
per cent and 0.2 per cent of A2, A1 and communal 
farmers own tractors, while 28.3 per cent, 29 per cent 
and 3.9 per cent hire in tractors, respectively. Water 
pumps support irrigated cropping programmes while 
tractors and cattle provide draught power which 
enables timely land preparation and planting and 
therefore greater scope to cope with climate change.
While there is debate on whether participants can 
openly identify their classes (Vogt et al., 2018), Table 4.2 
shows that individual farmers are able to do so using 
the categories in Table 4.2. Perceptions of individuals 
in different classes however differ per farming model. 
4.4 Politics, access, climate change 
resilience and smart cropping 
In the post land reform period, A2 farmers and the 
remaining large-scale farmers benefit from favourable 
state policy where they have better access to tobacco 
contract farming and Command Agriculture which 
support the production of maize and other food crops 
(Shonhe et al., 2020). Moreover, through state policy, 
A2 farmers have also benefited from the agricultural 
mechanisation programme (Shonhe, 2019; Gono, 
2020; Magaisa, 2020) as well as JVs involving former 
(now returning) white commercial farmers, some 
Chinese national and some black businessmen now 
venturing into commercial agriculture (Matondi, 2019; 
Shonhe, 2018; Mkodzongi and Lawrence, 2019). 
Based on the financial support in productive asset 
acquisition and the agricultural input support secured 
through the public and private sector mediated contract 
farming as well as through government programmes, 
A2 farmers are seen as more resilient to climate and 
socioeconomic and political vulnerabilities. This is in 
large part due to these favourable access dynamics. 
However, A2 farmers are also heterogeneous, as some 
also face challenges in accessing credit facilities and 
produce far less than others (Shonhe, 2021). As they 
are less favoured by government policy, accessing 
only the presidential input scheme which supports 
the production of maize, and more recently as availed 
through the Pfumvudza programme, smallholders 
in the A1 and CA models are less endowed with 
productive assets and tend to rely on personal savings, 
remittances and the reinvestment of proceeds from the 
sale of agricultural produce (Shonhe and Mtapuri, 2020; 
Mazwi, 2021). The reliance on precarious sources of 
funding by smallholder farmers and the production 
of crops that are less common on the commodity 
markets increases their vulnerability and reduces the 
scope for their resilience.
Where some food crops continue to be produced, 
their resilience to climate change is often low. In the 
case of Zimbabwe, some climate smart indigenous 
crops, such as rapoko, sweet potatoes and sorghum, 
have decreased in importance over the years. Farmers 
who are eager to earn returns in foreign currency have 
shifted to tobacco and maize crops. However, as 
this research reveals, these two crops are vulnerable 
to climate change and the financial returns are not 
entirely in foreign currency or in cash, as anticipated 
by farmers. The choice to produce tobacco is also 
influenced by available funding options. There is limited 
accumulation across study sites, reflecting adverse 
incorporation into the value chains, currently being 
worsened by the hike in Makoronyera activities (see 
also Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo, 2012; Shonhe, 
2021). Besides the cost of farming and fluctuating 
foreign exchange rates, government policies have 
undermined farmers' accumulation prospects as 
farmers have failed to adopt appropriate farming 
systems to increase their climate change resilience 
(key informant interview, DF, Arrowan farm, 2020). The 
need to commercialise often leads to the introduction 
of crop varieties that may be less ideal for the local 
climate (Eakin & Luers, 2006; Leichenko & O’Brien, 
2008; Newsham et al., 2018a a). In doing so, indigenous 
crops such as sorghum, rapoko and sweet potatoes 
are avoided, negatively affecting farmers’ resilience to 
climate change. The choice of a cropping programme 
is therefore influenced by a variety of factors, including 
the extent of incorporation in the global commodity 
circuits and the changing pricing matrix. Smallholder 
tobacco farmers sit at the bottom of the value chain 
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where they produce the crop but have no influence 
over its pricing in the market. They receive a small price 
for the crop that gains value exponentially at the point 
of export and at consumer product levels. Unlike in the 
past, when commercial farmers had a collective voice 
through farmers’ associations and had shares in the 
tobacco auction floors, the new tobacco producers are 
fragmented and lose control of the crop as soon as 
they deliver to the auction floors (Shonhe, 2021). This 
is far more the case for the contracted farmers who 
are often converted into disguised workers for global 
capital on their farms (Shonhe, 2019).
Farmers in Mvurwi have not been able to develop more 
resilience mechanisms to deal with globalisation and 
climate change exposure. In the communal areas, the 
cropping system often includes more reliable crop 
varieties and an array of drought resistant crops, such 
as rapoko and sweet potatoes, due to the prevalence 
of poverty in these areas. In the more commercialised 
sector, A1 and A2 farms (Chitapi and Shonhe, 2020), 
farmers are mostly motivated by profit rather than food 
security and as such, they may ignore climate risk 
considerations.
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This conclusion has two core objectives. First, we 
present headline conclusions based on our research. 
Second, we present the adaptation options most 
relevant to a smarter approach to commercial 
agriculture in the context of a changing climate. We 
contextualise these options through a consideration of 
the dynamic pressures and root causes that impinge 
upon the prospects for the introduction of these 
adaptation options.
5.1 Headline findings
Climate change and variability are already 
causing problems for tobacco production.
First, as the ZINGSA (2020) report makes clear, there 
has been a marked shift, in average terms, to a drier 
climate regime since the 1980s and a shorter rainy 
season. Our data point squarely to key difficulties 
that have resulted from these changes across our 
communal area, A1 and A2 field sites. Crucially, tobacco 
has become harder to farm under rainfed production 
systems. Transferring tobacco plants into the ground 
from seedbeds later in the season due to the rains not 
yet arriving, risks insufficient time for the crop to reach 
maturity. Similarly, the more erratic character of the 
rainfall reported across our fieldsites – intense bursts 
in short time periods, followed by prolonged stretches 
of days with little or no rainfall – has in some cases 
led to the abandonment of tobacco crops at worst, or 
at best a reduction in the quality of the crop. Where 
farmers without formal irrigation infrastructure do have 
access to sizable quantities of labour, a scotch cart 
and large receptacles for water transport, they can, at 
least in theory, make up for low or no rainfall as they 
transfer the crop from the seedbed. However, this is a 
labour-intensive and costly workaround, requiring 5L 
of irrigation per plant, for 1200–1500 plants per ha. In 
addition, the poorer farmers who might have the most 
to gain from being able to sell a cash crop are the least 
likely to have access even to these resources. In short, 
the sorts of changes to the rainy season that have been 
experienced in recent decades seem to be raising the 
question of whether, and for whom, it is worthwhile to 
grow tobacco under rainfed conditions, even in a part 
of Zimbabwe which is agro-ecologically favoured.
Tobacco production appears to be implicated in 
higher levels of deforestation in Mvurwi.
The conversations we had with farmers often brought 
up comments on and concerns about the levels of 
tree cutting, locally, that were required in order to 
cure harvested tobacco. Availability of wood, by some 
reports, had reduced so much that it was becoming 
difficult to source, to the extent that some were 
questioning whether they could even continue to grow 
tobacco. These findings are consistent with APRA 
remote sensing data collected in 2018, which indicates 
patterns of increases and decreases of land cover 
influenced by the politics, broader macroeconomic 
conditions that affected the area under crop production 
and the cropping programmes, which shifted overtime 
(Maguranyanga et al., 2021). To be sure, tobacco 
curing is by no means the only factor driving tree 
cutting, especially after 2009 when contract farming-
driven tobacco production attracted a broad mass of 
farmers from communal and A1 farms. In the Chiweshe 
communal area, the arrival of farmworkers who had 
been evicted from farms under the FTLRP had put extra 
pressure on land. The need for pasture for livestock 
displaced by incoming farmworkers – even with 
reduced herd sizes – was also mentioned in relation to 
tree cutting. Clearly, this reduces options for the use of 
non-timber forest products for medicinal and nutrition 
purposes, but in the context of an already-warming 
picture, reducing forest cover risks contributing to even 
higher levels of local warming.
Farmers are already adapting, but even with 
these adaptations tobacco and maize are riskier 
crops to grow than traditional grains. 
Echoing other studies in Zimbabwe (Phiri et al., 2019; 
Asare-Nuamah, Mandaza and Amungwa, 2021) our 
findings show that farmers are keenly aware of important 
variations in temperature and precipitation patterns, 
as well as their implications for the growing season. 
Some of them are adapting to these variations, for 
instance with the introduction of short season varieties 
of both tobacco and maize. Given that to some extent 
to farm is by definition to adapt, and given everything 
that has been written in Zimbabwe, Southern Africa 
and much further afield about the wealth of agro-
5 CONCLUSION
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ecological knowledge farmers possess (Richards, 
1985; Scoones and Thompson, 2009; Newsham and 
Thomas 2011), this is wholly unsurprising. Starting 
with what farmers already know and do will, as ever, 
be the starting point for more effective and legitimate 
adaptation. And yet it remains the case that when we 
conducted a risk analysis of crops commonly grown in 
communal, A1 and A2 areas, the results did not lead 
to the recommendation that those without access to a 
good irrigation infrastructure, significant labour power 
and inputs should produce tobacco as a commercial 
crop. Larger scale producers of tobacco in the area – 
such as the Foresters farm, which grows up to 700ha 
of tobacco yearly – which do have this infrastructure 
are already better adapted to climate change than 
those without it. The results also suggest that whether 
for subsistence or commercial purposes, crops other 
than maize would be less susceptible to drought and 
other risk factors, climate-related or otherwise. Given 
how risky tobacco in particular is as a commercial crop 
for many of the smallholder farmers that have chosen 
to grow it and given also that there are alternative crops 
that could be grown – sweet potato and the familiar 
suite of ‘ancient grains’ amongst them – the question 
arises as to why tobacco is chosen. Indeed, when we 
were conducting the exercise in which climate and 
economic risks were identified and impaired across 
crops with A1 farmers, they themselves questioned 
their focus on tobacco production, in particular when 
they saw the results of the exercise. This might indicate 
that farmers are not adequately equipped with the right 
information to make informed decisions on climate and 
economic risk-free cropping programmes. 
Contract farming and the Makoronyera (black-
market) appear to be key ‘push factors’ in 
choices around tobacco production.
A key driving factor is related to the presence of contract 
farming and the Makoronyera. These offer access to 
inputs and markets, and to farmers for whom access to 
either is often precarious or non-existent. They thereby 
hold out for the prospect of producing a crop which is 
often paid for in US dollars, resolving the conundrum 
of inflation eating into earnings in the local currency. 
Especially for poorer farmers and in particular in 
communal areas, the absence (perceived or actual) of 
better vehicles for commercialisation seems in recent 
years to have pushed them towards choosing tobacco, 
either without a full appreciation of the risks entailed, or 
even when there is awareness of them. Exacerbating 
this tendency is the reduction in support from 
agricultural extension (and veterinary) services owing 
to a lack of funding. Agricultural extension officers 
we spoke to and worked with expressed scepticism 
around tobacco commercialisation under rainfed 
conditions and had done their best to communicate 
this locally. However, reduced access to farmers 
meant that this scepticism had not been as widely 
communicated as it might otherwise require, and it 
had been less possible to provide extension support 
around looking into other options.
There are broad differentiations in vulnerability 
and resilience across and within communal area, 
A1 and A2 farmers.
In broad brush terms, A1 and A2 farmers tend to 
be better-equipped to deal with climate impacts, 
especially to the extent that they are better resourced. 
This is because they grow a wider scale of crops or 
have established irrigation infrastructure, albeit on a 
small-scale, to be able to guarantee viable production 
at the end of every season. At the other end of the 
scale, at the time the research was taking place, most 
communal area farmers in Chiweshe were receiving 
food aid, according to one agricultural extension 
officer. This is an acute demonstration of how difficult 
even subsistence, let alone commercial farming, is 
against a backdrop of decades of economic decline, 
recurring bouts of inflation and the longer-run effects 
of dispossession and structural disadvantage/
marginalisation started in the colonial era and not yet 
fully left behind. There is significant variation within 
this picture, with access to irrigation, for instance, not 
just being a difficulty in communal areas but also for 
considerable numbers of A1 and A2 farmers. Within 
this mixed picture, there are key groups with which 
to engage, from a climate vulnerability perspective. 
More broadly, our results suggest the need for a 
greater focus on and level of support for those living 
in communal areas. But it is also important to consider 
those whose access to land and productive resources/
inputs is often precarious. This includes farmworkers 
who have moved back into communal areas, but also 
groups who have illegally settled in A1 and A2 areas. 
These groups, and perhaps especially those who 
are settled illegally, are less likely to have access to 
the government input support schemes and to what 
agricultural extension support is available.
Tobacco farming can credibly be considered a 
land reform ‘success story’, but for whom?
To come back to where we started this report, the 
hope and excitement around tobacco as a cash 
crop in the post-FLTRP era is, to a significant extent, 
vindicated by the staggering increase in its production 
amongst smallholder farmers. Tens of thousands 
of A1 farmers have made good on its commercial 
potential, even under initial conditions that many would 
have considered to be prohibitive. It is a powerful 
counterpoint to the narrative that land reform of the 
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kind that Zimbabwe has embarked upon has led only 
to disaster, and indeed to the (often racist) assumptions 
that black Zimbabwean farmers would not be able to 
make anything substantial of the opportunities afforded 
to them by access to land. There are studies which have 
found that on average, tobacco-producing households 
in Zimbabwe are more food-secure than those who 
do not produce it (e.g. Mapfumo, 2015). This picture 
provides support for commentators like Saul Ngarava 
(2020), who argue that tobacco does have a huge role 
to play in reducing hunger and poverty. And it makes 
it understandable that, given more farmers each year 
want to take it up, he would focus on recommending 
assistance for them to become better tobacco farmers.
We do not want to undermine the sense of achievement 
that A1 farmers or Zimbabweans more broadly might 
take from what Ngarava characterises as a revolution in 
Zimbabwe tobacco production. Our position is closer 
to scholars who have, in our view, shown that the 
outcomes of the land reform programme demonstrate 
that it needs to be taken seriously as a policy model, 
not just dismissed as economic ineptitude and elite 
cronyism on a national scale. And yet climate change 
does increase the level of risk to which farmers are 
exposed in ways which raise questions about implicitly 
endorsing its production and suggesting a policy focus 
on how to farm it better, especially for those without 
access to sufficient irrigation and labour. Moreover, 
the prospects for gaining these benefits look very 
different in the communal area context, even in one 
in the middle of a zone with prime agro-ecological 
conditions for tobacco production, precisely because 
of their varied levels of access to favourable production 
conditions. These in turn are the result of diminished 
possibilities and support linked to 30 years of a 
broader picture of economic stagnation and inflation 
crises which have been felt hardest in the communal 
areas and which, in Chiweshe, had left people hungry, 
resigned and without a sense of hope. For all the 
importance of understanding the rapidly unfolding 
commercialisation story of the A1 areas, a focus on 
climate change impacts on tobacco production, in the 
context of an analysis of access to what we might call 
the means of adaptation, shifts the focus back to the 
far larger quantities of people in the communal areas. 
These constitute a demographic that, by and large, 
have experienced much less in the way of benefits 
than those who received redistributed land, and who 
are still more sharply subject to the repercussions of 
Zimbabwe’s history as a settler colony. And that is 
before considering former large-scale farmworkers that 
have in so many cases had to return to the communal 
areas due to having nowhere else to go. Seen through 
the eyes of a communal area farmer, the tantalising 
prospect of agricultural commercialisation via tobacco 
as a route out of poverty and hunger often continues 
to look slim. 
5.2 Adaptation measures 
These questions of highly differentiated access to the 
productive resources which can contribute so much 
to adaptive capacity are foregrounded when we set 
tobacco production in the context of local DoV, the 
dynamic pressures and the root causes operating on 
them. A consideration of these dynamics is woven into 
the account of adaptation measures suggested below, 
the better to assess their feasibility. 
Irrigation access support
First, increasing access to irrigation infrastructure 
is the most obvious adaptation to a climate that has 
become drier, and in the context of increasingly erratic 
rainfall – even judging by the standards of a country 
which is long used to unpredictable rainfall patterns. 
This measure would, of course, be of assistance not 
just for tobacco, but for crop production more broadly, 
and for this reason, it is a common and now fairly 
long-standing recommended adaptation measure 
in much research into climate change, agriculture 
and adaptation in Zimbabwe (e.g. Nhemachena and 
Mano, 2007). At the same time, the costs of acquiring, 
installing and maintaining such infrastructure render 
it a prohibitive option for many (though not all) CA 
farmers, A1 and even A2 farmers. Given the decades 
of economic stagnation and crisis in Zimbabwe, 
leading to anaemic state revenues, constraints upon 
government funding and assistance for the provision 
of irrigation infrastructure to those who do not have 
access are currently prohibitive. The economic 
situation is also implicated in the shortage-prone 
and expensive electricity infrastructure upon which 
irrigation is often dependent. Moreover, the greater 
incidence of drought, linked to lower levels of rainfall 
since the 1980s, is reducing the amount of water 
available for irrigation, both in Mazowe (Tsiko, 2021) 
and nationally (Serpell, 2020). Even with these caveats, 
in areas such as Mazowe, with relatively plentiful water 
supply, irrigation could and arguably should be a 
priority for national and international funding aimed at 
climate change adaptation support.
In thinking through what form the support for irrigation 
might take, it will be important to explore not just large-
scale engineered irrigation schemes commonly called 
for in Zimbabwe in the context of increasing irrigation 
capacity. It is also worth paying attention to the different 
forms of farmer-led irrigation that are emerging on A1 
land in Masvingo district (Scoones, Murimbarimba and 
Mahenehene, 2019). Scoones et al. identified three 
loose categories of irrigators: homestead, aspiring 
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and commercial. They find these to be more flexible, 
resilient and in some cases more effective than the 
formal irrigation or group gardens also in operation 
in the same area. They do, however, across these 
three groups, highlight the unevenly distributed and 
differentiated opportunities for accumulating the 
level of capital required even to invest in irrigation 
infrastructure. Given accumulation opportunities are 
often even lower in communal areas, the implications 
for equity of access of supporting farmer-led irrigation 
would require careful thought.
Switch from tobacco to better-adapted crops 
and support their commercialisation for those 
for whom tobacco production has become 
routinely risky
In the case of farmers on the margins of tobacco 
production as a commercially viable prospect 
(particularly in communal areas), a potential 
adaptation could be to switch to other crops better 
adapted to current and projected growing conditions 
than tobacco, and which could potentially have 
viable commercial prospects. In the context of our 
research, crops such as sweet potato, sugar beans 
and rapoko may all be worth considering in this 
regard. For instance, there appears to be demand 
in nearby Harare for sweet potato as an inexpensive 
staple. There also appears to be a farm-gate market 
opportunity that only a small number of farmers in 
the area are currently exploiting. It is important to set 
this recommendation against an understanding of the 
reasons why farmers do not currently decide to grow 
more of these crops. To some extent it may be owing 
to a lack of market information for these crops. It is also 
bound up in the underlying questions of differentiated 
access – to markets, extension support, inputs etc. – 
which produce such different outcomes for tobacco 
production, particularly for those farmers who do and 
do not have access to irrigation infrastructure, and 
sufficient labour to produce and harvest the crop. In 
any case, strengthening both the commercial viability 
of better adapted crops and supporting farmers to 
connect with existing but under-exploited commercial 
opportunities are priorities which appear to us to 
be of particular relevance to poor and struggling 
farmers in communal areas and to a lesser extent in 
A1 and A2 areas. Farm-gate sales of climate smart 
crops through Makoronyera reduce marketing costs 
for farmers but may well cut off the growers from 
the value chains far too early in ways that reduces 
their returns. Linking farmers to the agrifoods value 
systems involving supermarkets and millers for sweet 
potatoes and rapoko, for example, would result in 
farmers earning higher returns. Sweet potatoes may 
also gain greater value if milled and consumed as 
porridge among other ways, earning higher returns 
to the farmers.
Grants and credit for investment in switching 
to and commercialising better-adapted crops. 
Third, offering support grants or credit to farmers 
to be able to purchase inputs and invest in gaining 
better access to markets could help reduce 
dependence on: 
a. Contract farming, which does supply inputs, but 
at high prices and provide a ready market forthe 
produce, but purchases tobacco at prices so far 
below market prices that commercial viability is 
difficult to achieve; even when climate impacts 
such as erratic rainfall do not induce crop failure
b. Makoronyera traders, who while at least offer 
the advantage of one type of market access, pay 
prices so low for produce, and sell on at such a 
premium that they bring to mind the ‘relational 
vulnerability’ that Marcus Taylor’s work so 
powerfully captures in the context of Andhra 
Pradesh, India (Taylor, 2013; 2014). 
A more difficult question to answer is who would 
be in a position to offer such support? International 
donors and NGOs may certainly want to consider 
this form of assistance. However, providing support 
for sufficiently long periods of time for a critical 
mass of smallholder farmers to establish themselves 
in cultivating and selling such crops is likely to go 
beyond what it is possible within the context of the 
project cycle. Moreover, as alluded to earlier, tobacco 
is not a crop or a cause that international donors 
might find easy or desirable to support. Appeals for 
funding might therefore need to be framed in terms of 
support for other, wider objectives, such as irrigation 
expansion. The Zimbabwean government is another 
potential candidate to provide financial support but 
has at best a mixed record in distributing support a) 
at times, only relevant to the electoral cycle and b) to 
farmers along political affiliation and/or connections 
to the political elite (Shonhe, 2018).
Support to existing agricultural extension 
services.
As mentioned in Section 2, access to research 
participants in our field sites was facilitated by 
the AREX arm of the Ministry of Agriculture. This 
work is frequently constrained by the absence of 
resources. In addition, AREX had a clear vision 
for commercialising agriculture in ways that would 
benefit small scale farmers. The commitment of 
the AREX officers to the research, their detailed 
knowledge of the people and places in which they 
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work and the obvious esteem in which they were 
often held, locally, is all suggestive of how much more 
they could do, if better resourced. 
Of course, the reasons for the decline in the level 
of service that AREX is able to provide can seem 
intractable. Zimbabwe’s economy is long-stalled, 
crisis-prone and now subject to the restrictions 
put in place in response to the global COVID-19 
pandemic. The government is already overstretched, 
and not currently in a position to fund a significant 
increase in the funding that AREX has to work with. 
Other extension services working with CA farmers, 
such as those provided by NGOs offering support to 
farmers to learn conservation agriculture methods, 
have, within the life of the funded projects they are 
part of, produced some worthwhile results, in the 
view of AREX officers. Yet when the funding ends 
and the support is withdrawn, the vast majority of 
farmers who received the support appear unable to 
continue to use conservation agriculture methods. 
Again, then, the likelihood of procuring such funding 
seems remote. It remains the case, nonetheless, that 
other worthwhile measures here, around pivoting 
towards better-adapted crops and strengthening 
existing or potential commercial options around them, 
especially for poorer farmers in communal lands and 
precarious groups across communal, A1 and A2 land, 
seems unlikely to happen in the absence of revived 
agricultural and veterinary extension services.
Form and connect cooperatives to strengthen 
national collective bargaining capacity. 
As mentioned in Section 4, one key difference between 
the pre- and post FTLRP eras is the diminished level 
of collective organisation and capacity to lobby the 
government that tobacco farmers used to more 
commonly exercise. Our research did uncover 
instances of farmer cooperatives that did offer the 
familiar benefits of pooling resources, but there remains 
much less in the way of national level organising and 
liaising with the government on behalf of smallholder 
growers. Given the contribution of smallholder 
agriculture to national tobacco production, there is 
scope to create a greater shared identity between 
growers, and to build more powerful mechanisms for 
collective action, for instance in negotiations around 
prices and currencies offered to farmers by the TIMB 
or the GMB. Again, expectations for the prospects of 
such a measure may need to be tempered against 
considerations of the extent to which farmers given 
A1 and A2 land lease titles are beholden to the 
government. Arguably, one of the benefits of land 
reform for the government is the extent to which a 
significant proportion of the electorate could be 
considered to be ‘captive’ (Mkodzongi, 2013). There 
may be fear of the consequences of taking a more 
assertive line and of making stronger demands. Yet 
strengthening capacity for collective organisation is 
worth considering all the same.  
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7 ANNEXES 
Annex 1: Crop hazard exposure and vulnerability analysis
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Total score 
per weight
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Total score per weight 15 13 19 8 0 0 55
Percentage of total 
weight
27.4 23.6 34.5 14.5 0 0 100
Source: Authors’ own, compiled from APRA climate change study, 2020
Key: 0=No impact; 1=Small impact; 2=Medium impact; 3=Disastrous impact
Annex 2: Class and wellbeing matrix from Chiweshe, Hariana A1 farm and Arrowan A2 farm
Chiweshe Communal farmers
Variable Rich Middle class Lower class Poor Very Poor






Medium access to 
food Small-scale 
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food security 
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Poor food security 
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mouth
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Mostly civil 
servants and A1 
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They have full 
government 
support. They 
sell inputs. They 
rent their land 
and are involved 
in deforestation. 
They have access 
to government 
resources.
Own no cattle or 
land.
Health 
They have access 
to clean water and 
have medical aid 
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Have very good 
access to health.
They have 
access to private 
hospitals.
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They have a three 
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or asbestos.
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have 2 bedrooms 
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water.
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They hire 2-5, but 
do not pay well.
These are the 
people who are 
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A2 farms
Emerging classes Best Better Good Average Vulnerable
% 2 10 38 20 30
Access to land
These are top civil 
servants. They 
own farms. They 
have mansions 
Have access to 
lucrative markets.
Small-scale 
farming. They are 
SSCFs.
They have access 
to land and jobs. 
They are SSCFs. 
Most are civil 
servants.
Till small pieces of 
land.




to clean water 
and access to 
international 
health care.
They can access 
healthcare 
facilities that are 
public and private. 
They have access 
to medical aid. 
Have very good 
access to health.
They can afford 
to see a private 
doctor.
Access to local 
medical services.







They suffer a risk 
of dying in their 
houses.
Cattles 300+ 50+ 20 5 0
Money
Get money from 
savings since 
they are business 
owners. Can 
afford to go for 
holidays outside 
the country.
They have money 
from their salary. 
They do not pay 
workers on time 
and consistently. 










They live from 
hand to mouth.
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Annex 3: Dimensions of vulnerability, a summary from transect walk, village mapping; 
observations and participatory learning. 
Dimension of 
vulnerability
Headline findings Relevant climate impacts? Relevant socioeconomic and 
political issues?
Livelihoods At all three sites, crop production 
and livestock rearing are important 
enterprises. However, informal trading 
was also highlighted as a key source 
of livelihoods by women. Due to 
de-industrialisation, many former 
urban workers have returned to the 
rural homes and are now involved in 
farming. Due to the informalisation of 
the economy, migration and resorting 
to piece work for social reproduction 
is increasing in significance. Some 
former farmworkers have bought rural 
homes in Chiweshe, thereby creating 
land pressures as some build houses 
in the mountains. Ravaging livestock 
diseases and depreciation of livestock 
rearing and marketing infrastructure 
as well as a drop in regulatory and 
oversight institutions are undermining 
agricultural productivity. A2 has a more 
diverse cropping programme of 11 
crops; with cucumbers and cabbages 
being added to A1 farms commodities, 
where tomatoes and sorghum are also 
unique out of 1o crops. A1 farmers 
are also involved in poultry, crafting, 
builders, transporters, milling, and 
dairy farming. In the CA, farmers grow 
eight crops: maize, groundnuts, sugar 
beans, tobacco, rapoko, cowpeas 
and sweet potatoes. They also keep 
livestock such as cattle, goats, turkeys, 
pigs, rabbits and guinea fowl.
Increasing land pressure is a 
hazard to the environment and 
cattle grazing. The shift to tobacco 
production which relies on firewood 
mostly for curing is responsible for 
ongoing deforestation in the Mvurwi 
area. 
Having recovered from years 
of colonial segregation and war 
instigated confinement in ‘keeps’, 
from 1980, there has been a 
sustained crisis in access to farming 
inputs and markets which impact on 
net income. However, farmers are 
not always eager to highlight these 
challenges, on political grounds. A 
negative turn was experienced from 
2000 when post-independence 
gains began to be eroded. The GNU 
economic fortunes also dissipated 
from 2017. Uncertainty emanating 
from macro-economic instability 
impacts farmers’ vulnerability.
Marketing
Sell maize to 
GMB. Produce 
100 t each 
season. Make 





They are involved 







Little access to 
markets.
In most cases 
they sell on the 
roadsides and 
local markets. 
They are involved 
in small-scale 
farming.
They are into 
gardening. Sell 
vegetables and 
fresh produce in 
the local markets.
Labour





They hire but do 
not pay 2–5.
These are the 
people who are 
hired.
Source: Authors’ own




 Across the settlement models, the 
variables identified as relevant to their 
0 differed. In Chiweshe, access to 
food, shelter, water and education 
were identified as crucial for household 
wellbeing. In the A1 model, access 
to health facilities, cattle, security of 
tenure, money, shelter, food and water 
and labour was observed as important. 
Comparatively, in the A2 model, 
access to health facilities, cattle, 
money, marketing and labour access 
were also identified as important. To 
achieve better wellbeing A1 farmers 
indicated they would also need land 
(farming), jobs, government support, 
inputs and loans.
 The identification of food and water 
in the CA and A1 models as well as 
cattle and money in the A1 and A2 
models illustrates the importance of 
agriculture across the sites. Climate 
change issues therefore influence 
farmers’ wellbeing.
Farmers in the A1 model however, 
also identified security of tenure, 
CA noted the importance of 
education while the A2 observed 
the importance of marketing access 
as critical for the improvement of 
their wellbeing. Labour access 
was equally important for the A1 
and A2 models. Equally, shelter 
was considered valuable in the 
CA and A1 models. Even though 
these socio-economic variables 
figure differentially across models, 







Crop and livestock farming choices 
are individually based and depend on 
farmers’ differentiated access to land, 
finance, irrigations, inputs, markets and 
labour. 
Inadequate response to changes 
in climate risks exposes farmers to 
yield reductions. Access to irrigation 
is a key success factor.
Differentiates access to finance, 




Farmers’ vulnerability increases with 
collapsing productive infrastructure that 
would normally aid farmers’ resilience. 
These include irrigation, electricity, 
road networks, dip-tanks, cattle 
auctioning, holding pens, dams, rivers 
and crop post-harvest processing and 
storage facilities. The input and output 
market access and commodity value 
chains moderate farmer accumulation 
differentially across farming models, 
but collective action is required to 
secure a voice along the chain. For 
example, Makoronyera buys outputs 
at cheap prices and resells, making 
a huge margin, impacting farmers' 
vulnerability. The macro-economic 
performance of the economy which 
impacts on the farmers’ vulnerability 
sensitivity may also require collective 
action to deal with input price hikes 
and how this is worsened by foreign 
exchange price distortions. Access to 
inputs and markets is highly politicised 
and requires collective action. The 
role of farmers’ associations and 
networks in the history of agricultural 
development in Zimbabwe is crucial.
Inadequate infrastructure impact 
on farming viability. Irrigation 
facilities access is not uniform 
across and within farming models. 
Some farmers are therefore able to 
irrigate and access markets more 
than others and are thus more 
resilient. There are however weak 
associations and thus farmers lack 
a voice.
Without viable farmers associations, 
farmers lack a voice. Communities 
may be organised as wards, villages 
and around schools, dip tanks 
via committees with political links 
through contesting parties at a local 
level. However, these committees 
lack a voice on agricultural issues 
beyond the distribution of the 
presidential input scheme support. 
One challenge identified relates 
to distorted commodity prices 
due to interchangeable use of the 
local Zimbabwean dollar and the 
United States dollar, as well as the 
retention of 40% of foreign currency 
earnings for tobacco farmers. Also, 
due to poor organisation, networks 
are poorly utilised for commodity 
marketing. 
Governance The prevalence of Makoronyera, poor 
infrastructure state of repair, lack of 
marketing information, deteriorating 
government services in the AREX 
department, inadequate planning in 
command agriculture and inadequate 
monitoring of tree cutting, as well 
as low replenishment through 
afforestation point to diminishing 
governance in Zimbabwe.
Deforestation will increase the impact 
of climate change, while farmers' 
resilience will remain precarious due 
to inadequate AREX advice. 
Poor policy implementation and 
corruption increases farmers’ 
vulnerability and reduces prospects 
for accumulation.
Source: Authors’ own
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